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INTO THE AMAZON: CIARITY
AND TRANSPARENCY IN FTC
SECTION 5 MERGER DOCTRINE
CHRISTINA C. MAt
INTRODUCTION

Antitrust law seeks to preserve competition and check
unconstrained power in the market place. Although this basic
precept of antitrust law has not changed, shifts in how
competition is defined and conceptualized-whether people
should get their fair share or whether companies should be
provided with the requisite resources to compete-have changed
antitrust doctrine. Does it mean that companies be provided the
requisite resources to compete-have changed antitrust doctrine.
Take, for example, the Sherman Act. The Sherman Act provides
that "[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce
among the several States . .. is declared to be illegal" and actions

taken by parties to "monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to
monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several
States . .. shall be deemed guilty of a felony."' For many years,

the Sherman Act was enforced to the letter and without
exception.
In 1911, however, the Supreme Court, in the
landmark Standard Oil Co. v. United States' case, held that only
unreasonable restraints of trade would be illegal, expressing a
shift in doctrine and the Court's views on competition.

I Antitrust Associate, Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen, & Katz. For helpful
conversations and comments on earlier drafts, I am grateful to Scott Hemphill,
Sarah Littlechild, and Ryan Mott. Thanks also to the editors of the St. John's Law
Review for their terrific editorial work.
I Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (2012).
2 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
3 See id. at 76-77.
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Today, while concerns of smoke-filled dealings among
industry leaders are still real and present, the name of the game
is no longer "if you can't beat them, join them," but rather "if you
can't beat them, buy them."5 Antitrust doctrine has similarly
evolved consistent with changing business norms, with
increasing attention paid to merger enforcement by the Antitrust
Department of the Department of Justice ("DOJ") and the
Federal Trade Commission ("FTC" or the "Commission"), and
with relatively less judicial intervention or regulation of
anticompetitive conduct. This has been particularly true in the
quickly changing international and e-markets."
In evaluating and accepting or rejecting merger requests, the
DOJ and FTC both operate under the power of section 7 of the
Clayton Act, which provides:
"No person engaged in
commerce ... shall acquire . .. the whole or any part of the stock

or ... the assets of another person engaged also in
commerce ... the effect of such acquisition may be substantially
to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly,"7 and
section 1 of the Sherman Act, text provided above.8
The FTC also operates under section 5 of the FTC Act, which
gives it the exclusive power to prohibit "[ulnfair methods of
competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts
or practices in or affecting commerce."9
4 See, e.g., Michael Arrington, So a Blogger Walks into a Bar... , TECHCRUNCH
(Sept. 21, 2010), http://techcrunch.com/2010/09/21/so-a-blogger-walks-into-a-bar/.
5 See Mergers and Acquisitions--Joining Forces To Compete with Industry
Giants, Seeking Refuge with a LargerPartner,FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECOMMERCE,
http/ecommerce.hostip.info/pages/725/Mergers-Acquisitions.html (last visited Mar.
6, 2014); Ronald W. Davis, Innovation Markets and Merger Enforcement: Current
Practicein Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 677 (2003-2004).
6 Cf Michael L. Katz & Howard A. Shelanski, Mergers and Innovation, 74
ANTITRUST L.J. 1, 2 (2007) ("Merger policy faces a perplexing problem in industries
marked by ongoing technological innovation: a problem related, in part, to the
uncertain fit between the market conditions that produce innovation and the market
conditions to which antitrust policy generally aspires, and, in part, to uncertainty
about how innovation might affect market structure and performance."). The new
Merger Guidelines also evidence a growing concern with stifling innovation and the
importance of a variety of products. See Herbert Hovenkamp, Merger Policy and the
2010 Merger Guidelines (Oct. 16, 2010) (unpublished legal studies research paper),
available at httpJ/ssrn.com/abstract=1693246.
7 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
8 15 U.S.C. § 4 (2012). Formally, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ under the
guidance of the U.S. Attorney General enforced the Sherman Act. However, both the
FTC and states enforce the Sherman Act.
9 Federal Trade Commission Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 45(aX1) (2012).
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Under these broad legislative mandates, the DOJ and the
FTC have significant flexibility to guide and change antitrust
doctrine to be responsive to changing economic times and to the
particularities of a given transaction.o At the same time, because
most large transactions are subject to pre-merger agency
notification," these shifts in merger doctrine occur behind an
administrative curtain, are relatively non-public," and have little
precedential value despite directly impacting corporations and
other entities that compete in today's marketplace.
And, while the courts have offered some guidance as to the
scope of section 7 merger enforcement, they have been
comparatively silent as to the scope of section 5 enforcement
power.13 The FTC, therefore, has substantially more power to
mold and give shape to antitrust law than the DOJ because it
operates under both section 7 and section 5, a power which is
coupled with the benefits of an internal adjudicative procedure.
This difference in power is problematized by the agencies' de facto
10See infra Part II.A.2 (discussing the degree to which transactions are
approved or settled through consent decrees). Although length only serves as one
proxy for the level of detail and direction Congress has given, a simple comparison of
the Clayton Act at eleven pages, Clayton Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat.
730 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), and the FTC Act at
eight pages, Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. 41-58 (2012)), to the Dodd-Frank Act, which
stands at 848 pages, Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), suggests that compared to
modern day statutes, these older antitrust laws gave substantially more discretion
to the agencies than might have otherwise been given in today's legislative context.
11 See infra Part L.A (describing Hart-Scott-Rodino notification process).
12 The FTC and the DOJ are still required to submit a public report anytime an
actual challenge is brought; however, the opinions are cursory and the notice and
comment publications are often written with reference to general terms of the
transaction. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). Thus, for both public and industry members, prior
transactions may provide little guidance as to the relevant standards and analysis of
the agencies.
13 See S. REP. No. 63-597, at 13 (1914); H.R. REP. No. 63-1142, at 18-19 (1914)
(Conf. Rep.); Neil W. Averitt, The Meaning of "UnfairMethods of Competition"in Section
5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 21 B.C. L. REv. 227, 276-87 (1979-1980)
(describing legislative and case law history evincing expansive view of what constitutes
"unfair methods of competition"); Peter C. Carstensen & Nina H. Questal, The Use of
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act To Attack Large Conglomerate Mergers,
63 CORNELL L. REv 841, 850-51 (1978) ("Congress used sweeping language to avoid
limiting the applicability of the Act to a particular practice or category of practices."); see
also FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966) ("It is clear that the Federal Trade
Commission Act was designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the
Clayton Act to stop in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would
violate those Acts .... ).
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division of enforcement by industry. For example, any merger or
acquisition in the beer industry will likely be reviewed by the
DOJ, whereas a merger or acquisition in the wine or liquor
industry will be reviewed by the FTC.' As a result, different
industries may face substantially different legal standards as a
result of section 5 or may be placed under different settlement
pressures because of the different administrative procedures
available to the FTC.
This Article seeks to track the problems that arise with both
the procedural and substantive differences in antitrust
enforcement between the DOJ and FTC, with particular emphasis
on understanding how section 515 has been and can be used to
extend merger enforcement law beyond the traditional confines of
section 7 of the Clayton Act." Ultimately, this Article concludes
by suggesting that the FTC draft section 5-specific Merger
Guidelines" describing the scope of section 5 and how the FTC
14 FED. TRADE COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT
BETWEEN THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND THE ANTITRUST DIVISION OF THE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE CONCERNING CLEARANCE PROCEDURES FOR

INVESTIGATIONS 3, 8-11 (2002), availableat http://ww.justice.gov/atr/public/10170.pdf;
Nathan Chubb, Comment, Agency Draw: How Serious Questions in Merger Review
Could Lead to Enhanced Merger Enforcement, 18 GEO. MASON L. REV. 533, 559
(2011); Aruna Viswanatha, Justice or FTC. Which Agency Will Review Comcast-NBC
Deal?, MAIN JUST. (Dec. 9, 2009, 3:34 PM), http://www.mainjustice.com/2009/12/09/
justice-or-ftc-which-agency-will-review-comcast-deal/.
1615 U.S.C. §§ 45(a)(1), 45(b).
16 Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. §18 (2012). While there is a rich academic literature
describing how section 5 may give shape as a supplement to the Sherman Act, much less
has been written on how section 5 may give shape to the Clayton Act and its merger
provision. See, e.g., Susan A. Creighton et al., Some Thoughts About the Scope of Section
5: Workshop on Section 5 of the FTC Act, FED. TRADE COMM. 1 (Oct. 17, 2008),
http/www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public events/section-5-ftc-actcompetition-statute/screighton.pdf (discussing how section 5 can be used in context of the
Sherman Act in light of historical limitations); GERARD C. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE 36-38 (1968)

(describing advantages of section 5 over section 2 of the Sherman Act); Andy J. Miller,
Note, A ProceduralApproach to "UnfairMethods of Competition", 93 IOWA L. REV. 1485,
1489-90 (2008) (arguing to interpret section 5 as reaching conduct in its incipiency);
Lauren E. Schrero, A New Era in Section 5 Enforcement: The FTC Steps (Back) Up to the
Plate (on file with author) (reviewing how recent cases parallel earlier attempts to
expand Section 5 within context of the Sherman Act).
1 Merger Guidelines are provisions drafted by the DOJ and the FTC,
explicating their approach to analyzing a given merger, giving parties a sense of
when a particular transaction will be challenged. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED.
TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (2010) [hereinafter HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http//ftc.gov/os/2010/08/100819hmg.pdf ("These
Guidelines describe the principal analytical techniques and the main types of evidence on
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intends to enforce section 5. This will appease courts' concerns of
agency abuse and will provide greater predictability to merging
parties.
Part I of this Article provides a description of the enforcement
procedures available to the DOJ and the FTC and of the existing
standards guiding enforcement. Part II discusses how agency
settlements and greater court deference to the agencies has
changed the landscape of merger enforcement, raising
transparency and accountability concerns. 8 These concerns are
magnified within the FTC because of its administrative proceeding
and section 5 powers, ultimately providing the FTC with greater
opportunity to shape merger law.19 Despite the expansive
discretion available to the FTC, section 5 case law is sparse. Part
III tracks early attempts to broaden the scope of section 5 through
the courts. It concludes by examining recent judicial limitations
on section 7 and, subsequently, section 5, providing justification
for an independent section 5 doctrine.21 Part IV will suggest that
while section 5 may in theory be more expansive than section 7,
the FTC must provide clearer guidance before courts accept
independent section 5 liability and must apply section 5 doctrines
to all industries to ensure fairness in the review process. Part IV
proposes that the FTC establish its own merger guidelines,
delineating between mergers targeted by section 5 and those
targeted by section 7.2
MERGER ENFORCEMENT

I.

As a general rule, mergers over $68.2 million must be
reported to the antitrust agencies for pre-merger review. 23 This
filing is funneled to the appropriate antitrust agency-either the
FTC or DOJ depending on the industries involved 2 4-which then

which the Agencies usually rely to predict whether a horizontal merger may
substantially lessen competition.").
18 See infra Part II.
19 See infra Part II.B.1.
20

See infra Part III.A-B.

21 See infra Part III.C.
22 See infra Part IV.

23 Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the Clayton Act,
77 Fed.
Reg. 4323 (Jan. 27, 2012).
24 See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS

132

(2007)

[hereinafter

ANTITRUST

MODERNIZATION

COMM'N},

available at

http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amereport-recommendation/amc-final-report.pdf.
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reviews the transaction and evaluates whether the merger will
have an anticompetitive effect.
Until agency clearance is
obtained, the transaction is at a standstill. While the FTC and
DOJ operate under the same Merger Guidelines2 5 in reviewing
the transaction and largely operate under the same procedures in
challenging transactions, there are important differences which
provide the FTC with additional procedural powers. This Part
seeks to provide a very brief background on the procedural
mechanisms of antitrust merger enforcement, which is important
in contextualizing the Article's analysis. Part L.A examines the
basic pre-merger procedures parties must comply with under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. Part I.B describes procedural differences
between the FTC and DOJ both in the agencies' initial review
and on appeal to a federal district court. Finally, Part. I.C
provides some history on the joint-agency Merger Guidelines that
were designed to standardize the substantive standards between
the FTC and the DOJ and to mitigate differentiated outcomes
between the agencies.
A.

The Hart-Scott-RodinoAct and Initial Filings
When parties decide to consummate a particular merger or
acquisition, they must typically obtain clearance from the
antitrust agencies.2 6 These initial filing and review procedures
are governed by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act ("HSR" or the "HSR
Act").
The HSR Act requires that counterparties to the
transaction file a "Notification and Report Form," setting forth
the terms of the proposed transaction.2 8 Parties must wait thirty

Id. at 200.
Pre-merger notification is only required where the transaction proposed is for
$68.2 million or more. Revised Jurisdictional Thresholds for Section 7A of the
Clayton Act, 77 Fed. Reg. at 4,323-02. Where parties suspect that a transaction will
nonetheless result in antitrust scrutiny, parties may request a letter of opinion from
the relevant agency to avoid the risk of post-termination break-up.
27 Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94435, § 201, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012)).
28 Although the HSR Act only requires filing for transactions of a certain size
or
where parties have met a threshold in terms of annual sales or assets, for the
purposes of this discussion, this Article assumes that the mergers of interest for this
Article will typically require an HSR filing. Additionally, absent an HSR filing, the
agencies are still free to request information and otherwise investigate the merger or
acquisition and so the discussion following is still relevant for smaller parties and
transactions. 16 C.F.R. § 803.1 (2013); see 16 C.F.R. § 803 app'x (2013).
25
26
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days,29 providing a window of time for the agency responsible for
the case30 to determine whether they will issue a "Request for
Additional Information and Documentary Material," otherwise
known as a "Second Request.""

As the DOJ Merger Review

Policy states, during this waiting period, "[tihe staff is
encouraged to be as aggressive as possible" and the parties and
counsel "are encouraged to be equally active in framing issues for
inquiry, substantiating claimed defenses and responding in a
timely manner to staff requests."32 It is in the parties' interest to
be as cooperative as possible to avoid a Second Request because
of the additional time and cost that such a request places on
often time-sensitive transactions. If a Second Request is made,
the relevant agency receives a much more substantial record of
the relevant transaction and must thereafter make a final
decision to approve or challenge the transaction in an
adjudicative forum.3 4
B.

The ProceduresDiverge

Although the initial filing and review processes are the same
under both the FTC and the DOJ, agency procedures diverge
after a decision to challenge the transaction has been made. In
other words, once an agency concludes that the transaction will
substantially lessen competition, how each agency thereafter
challenges the problematic transaction varies.
If the DOJ decides that it wants to challenge a proposed
transaction, the DOJ must seek to enjoin the parties from
merging by requesting and obtaining a preliminary and
permanent injunction from a federal district court. 5 The DOd's
complaint will generally include a description of the challenged
- 16 C.F.R. § 803.10 (2013). There are exceptions to the thirty-day waiting
period. Namely, if the transaction is an all-cash tender offer, then the waiting period
is narrowed to fifteen days. Id.
30 See supra note 14 and accompanying text (discussing the industry division
between the FTC and DOJ).
31 16 C.F.R. § 803.20 (2013).
32 ANTITRUST DIVISION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER REVIEW PROCESS
INITIATIVE 2 (Dec. 14, 2006), available at http//wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/220
237.pdf.
33 A Second Request, unlike the initial filing, will involve an extensive inquiry
into the parties' industry, requiring large document requests and on occasion,
interviews with consumers, competitors, and other interested parties. See id. at 2-3.
34 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 24, at 151.
31 See id. at 138-39.
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action, the relevant markets of interest, the competitive effects of
the merger or acquisition, the violation alleged, and the
requested relief." If the court finds in favor of the DOJ, the
transaction is enjoined." If the court finds for the parties, the
parties are free to close the deal." Both the DOJ and the parties
may also appeal the case to the appellate level and eventually,
the Supreme Court.
If, on the other hand, the FTC decides that it wants to
challenge a proposed transaction, the FTC may request a
preliminary injunction from a federal district court to enjoin the
transaction.4 0 It is not, however, required to do so and even in
such instances where a request for a preliminary injunction is
made, the FTC will rarely request a permanent injunction.4 1
" Id. at 64.
* See id. at 130.
3

See id.

39 Guide to the Antitrust Laws: The Enforcers, FED. TRADE COMMISSION,
http://www.ftc.gov/bd/antitrustlenforcers.shtm (last visited Mar. 8, 2014).

40 15 U.S.C. § 53(b)
(2012) ("Whenever the Commission has reason to
believe ... that any person, partnership, or corporation is violating, or is about to
violate, any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission ... the
Commission . .. may bring suit in a district court of the United States to enjoin any
such act or practice .... [A] preliminary injunction may be granted.. . .").
41 Recent cases have suggested that the standard for granting a preliminary
injunction to the FTC is in fact lower than the standard faced by the DOJ. In FTC v.
H.J. Heinz Co., the court noted that Congress recognized that the traditional fourpart equity standard that is typically applied when determining whether to issue a
preliminary injunction is not "appropriate for the implementation of a Federal
statute by an independent regulatory agency." 246 F.3d 708, 714 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
The court, in FTC v. Whole Foods Market, affirmed this standard, finding that a
district court should grant a preliminary injunction anytime the FTC raises
questions "so serious, substantial, difficult[,] and doubtful" with regard to the merits
of the proposed transaction that a full administrative hearing is warranted. 548 F.3d
1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (alteration in original). This standard was affirmed in
FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D.D.C. 2009) (citing FTC v.
Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1072 (D.D.C. 1997)). As practitioners have noted, Whole
Foods and CCC Holdings will likely mean that the "FTC is likely to be energized to
bring more cases of this nature and to pursue them longer into the process than
previously." FTC v. Whole Foods: The Standard May Be More Important than the
Substance, ARNOLD & PORTER LLP CLIENT ADVISORY 5 (Aug. 2008),
http://www.arnoldporter.com/resources/documents/CAFTCvWhole%20FoodsThe%20Standard_080108.pdf. The FTC is also likely to "rely [more heavily] on its
own administrative proceedings to resolve whether a transaction violates the
antitrust laws." Peter J. Love & J. Bruce McDonald, Antitrust Alert: U.S. FTC and
Whole Foods Settle Long-Running Merger Challenge, JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS
(Mar.
2009),
httpJ/wwwjonesday.com/newsknowledge/publicationdetail.aspx?
publication=5991. Furthermore, the FTC will be emboldened by the decisions to
pursue an aggressive merger enforcement policy. FTC Obtains Preliminary
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Alternatively, the agency may also choose to forego a district
court proceeding entirely and instead challenge the transaction
within an internal administrative proceeding before an FTC
selected Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ").4 2 The Commission
will file its complaint with the ALJ," who will then act as the
presiding judge over the proceeding and evaluate whether or not
the transaction does raise anticompetitive concerns. Note that
the FTC may raise allegations both under the Clayton and
Sherman Acts as well as under section 5 of the FTC Act. section
5 allegations may be strategically important in sensitive cases
because unlike the Sherman and Clayton Acts, section 5 liability
is not subject to treble damages.'
If the FTC or the parties are unsatisfied with the ALJ's
holding, either party may appeal, but the first appeal is made to
the Commission, the same Commission that filed the initial
complaint.4 5 If the FTC upholds the ALJs decision, the parties
may then appeal to a federal district court where the
Commission's determination will be subject to Chevron
deference.4 6
C.

Merger Guidelinesand StandardizingSubstance
In 1968, the DOJ and the FTC promulgated the first jointagency Merger Guidelines which codified some of the agencies'
basic enforcement policies. Those Guidelines have since been
amended several times to reflect changing doctrine and
approaches to enforcement.47
The Guidelines "describe the
Injunction To Block CCC/Mitchell Merger; Parties Abandon Transaction, WEIL
BRIEFING: ANTITRUST/COMPETITION 5 (Mar. 20, 2009), http://www.weil.com/files/
upload/Weil BriefingAntitrustMarch_20.pdf.
42

See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 24, at 129.

See id. Unlike the DOJ, which is constrained by the procedures of the FRCP,
the FTC procedures are governed by administrative rules, 16 C.F.R. § 3-4, which in
many ways mirror the FRCP. See Charles E. Spicknall, Chilcutt v. United States:
The Fifth Circuit Creates a Test for Sanctioning Government Attorneys Personally
Under Rule 37, 69 TUL. L. REV. 260, 266 n.41 (1994).
" See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); Stephen Calkins, Symposium: Summary Judgment,
Motions to Dismiss, and Other Examples of EquilibratingTendencies in the Antitrust
System, 74 GEO. L.J. 1065, 1083-84 (1986).
46 Although the process seems a bit counterintuitive, it's not unheard of for the
Commission as appellate judge to overturn a holding that favors the Commission as
prosecutor.
46 See Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
47 See, e.g., Hillary Greene, Guideline Institutionalization:The Role of Merger
Guidelines in Antitrust Discourse, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 771, 781 (2006). Note that
13
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principal analytical techniques and the main types of evidence on
which the Agencies usually rely to predict whether a horizontal
merger may substantially lessen competition" and "are intended
to assist the business community .. . by increasing the
transparency of the analytical process ... [and] may also assist
the courts in developing an appropriate framework for
interpreting and applying the antitrust laws."4 8
Although these Guidelines provide some insight into how the
agencies will review a particular transaction, and might
successfully mitigate some of the agencies' procedural
differences,4 9 the Guidelines are limited. They do not provide
clear standards or rules; thus, merging parties cannot necessarily
ascertain when a transaction will be challenged in the same way
that litigating parties can rely on past precedent to predict the
outcome of a case. Rather, the Guidelines present the available
set of tools the agencies have in evaluating the transaction and
the range of potential relevant factors that the agencies will or
may consider." Moreover, the Guidelines are not binding on the
agencies." As will be discussed, the Guidelines have given courts
reason to defer to agency decisions or reasoning and have been
influential in this manner, but insofar as agency determinations
have appeared inconsistent with prior doctrine, courts are free to
reject the agencies' Guideline applications. 52

the agencies also adopted joint non-horizontal merger guidelines (i.e. vertical merger
guidelines), last amended in 1984. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NON-HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES 23 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public
guidelines/2614.pdf. Similarly to the horizontal merger guidelines, these provide
standards by which agencies evaluate particular transactions, with the aim of
providing guidance to parties and of creating more uniform outcomes in merger
review. See id. While the non-horizontal merger guidelines play an important role in
antitrust enforcement, challenges to vertical merges are rare. Cf Joseph P. Bauer,
Government Enforcement Policy of Section 7 of the Clayton Act: Carte Blanche for
Conglomerate Mergers?, 71 CALIF. L. REV. 348, 349-50 (1983) ("In 1982 .. . the
Department of Justice promulgated new Merger Guidelines, indicating that it will not
challenge non-horizontal mergers, unless the transactions are likely to have an adverse
impact on actual or potential competition."). Therefore, the focus of this Article is on
the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.
4 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 1.
49 Id.
5o Id.
r' Id. at 1 n.2.
52 See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (discussing the role of Merger
Guidelines in court decisions).
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The role of the Merger Guidelines is important to
understanding how section 5 doctrine takes form and develops.
Although the current Merger Guidelines cover merger
enforcement under the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the
FTC Act," this Article will argue that a more defined distinction
between section 5 and section 7 liability is important to the
agencies' legitimacy and parties' expectations and further argue
that such distinctions likely already exist despite the ostensible
equivalence under the Guidelines. In light of the legislative
intent of section 5 discussed in Part II, and the likely growing
substantive divergence between the FTC and the DOJ discussed
in Part III, this Article will argue for separate Guidelines
governing section 5 doctrine.
II. THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE OF COMPETITION LAW

The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act drastically changed the landscape
of merger enforcement and provided the agencies, particularly the
FTC, with an opportunity to expand or at the very least enforce
competition law more aggressively. 5 4
Today, as this Part argues, the FTC finds itself in a very
different regulatory world, one that is more favorable to an
expansive use of section 5 within the merger context. This Part
will proceed in three sections. In Part II.A, this Article will
examine the manifold structural changes that have enabled the
antitrust agencies to control, direct, and change merger
enforcement law. Part II.B will consider how the FTC has used,
and can use, section 5 within these new structures to leverage
merging parties and direct merger enforcement law in even more
"extreme" directions. Finally Part II.C provides some reasons why
we might be concerned with the current use of section 5.
Structural ChangesPermittingAgency-Made Law

A.

The arc of antitrust law can be characterized as an evolution
from common to statutory law and, over the course of the last fifty
years, an evolution from statutory interpretation and enforcement
by the courts to one of regulatory interpretation and enforcement
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17.
* See Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94435, 90 Stat. 1383 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012)); infra notes 55-72
and accompanying text (explaining the role of HSR in changing merger
enforcement).
-
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by the agencies." This relatively recent shift is a consequence of
statutory and subsequent structural changes made within
antitrust law and its agencies. As this Section will describe, the
passage of the HSR Act, 6 coupled with the advent of the consent
decree57 and a lessening of court oversight, as well as greater
deference to agencies on particular antitrust theories, 58 provide the
antitrust agencies with substantial discretion to inform and
enforce competition law.
HSR and Premerger Filings
In 1976, Congress passed the HSR Act," requiring merging
parties to submit premerger filings for the review and approval of
the antitrust agencies.6 0 Agencies were thus able to intervene
prior to the consummation of a transaction. 6 ' Although initially
1.

55 See State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 20 (1997) (acknowledging the Sherman Act
as a common law statute); Lawrence M. Frankel, The Flawed InstitutionalDesign of US.
Merger Review: Stacking the Deck Against Enforcement, 2008 UTAH L. REV. 159, 175-76
& n.61 ("The merger control system in the Unites States, like the rest of antitrust law,
began under a 'law enforcement' model, in which a prosecutorial entity would attempt to
prove to a judicial body violations of a clearly stated legal rule on an ex post basis.").
I See infra notes 60-66 and accompanying text (explaining how HSR Act changed
shape of merger enforcement).
61 See infra notes 71-82 and accompanying text (documenting the rise in consent
decrees and consequences). But cf Richard G. Parker, Senior Deputy Dir., Bureau of
Competition, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Address before the Annual Briefing for Corporate
Counsel, Washington, D.C.: Trends in Merger Enforcement and Litigation (Sept. 16,
1998) (transcript available in 5 HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST L. app. E86 (2012)) (arguing
"agencies increasingly are recognizing that not all cases can be settled, and that a
settlement which does not effectively restore competition is not worth adopting").
58 See infra notes 83-94 and accompanying text (describing how lack of court
precedent and greater influence of agencies in cases heard has led to greater agency
control over merger enforcement law).
" See 90 Stat. 1383.
'o See id. § 201; see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement and
the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1275 (1998-1999)
(noting HSR "fundamentally altered existing practice regarding the application of
antitrust law to corporate mergers," but made "no changes to the substantive antitrust
rules regarding mergers"). For a more detailed description of how parties make their
HSR filings and the subsequent processes, see generally Frankel, supra note 55, at 16061; Merger Review, FED. TRADE COmm'N, http-//www.ftc.gov/enforcement/merger-review
(last visited Apr. 16, 2014).
61 See William J. Kolasky, Jr. & James W. Lowe, The Merger Review Process at the
FederalTrade Commission: AdministrativeEfficiency and the Rule of Law, 49 ADIVIIN. L.
REv. 889, 897 ('The stated purpose of the [HSR] Act was to give the agencies 'an effective
mechanism to enjoin illegal mergers before they occur.'") (quoting S. REP. No. 94-803, at
72 (1976)). Note that this was a distinct change from past practices. See Bhagwat, supra
note 60, at 1275 (noting HSR drastically shifted agency power in merger enforcement);
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envisioned merely as a pre-notification statute, the HSR Act has
provided the antitrust agencies with substantial leverage and
power over mergers and acquisitions.6 2 This power stems from the
agencies' ability to delay merger transactions that are, by their
very nature, time sensitive.6 3 Because parties seeking approval
are first and foremost concerned with avoiding delay and a
"Second Request,"" merging parties and their lawyers are
increasingly concerned with whether a particular transaction will
"please or displease the current antitrust officials,"65 rather than
asking the seemingly obvious question: does this merger violate
antitrust law?66 As Ashutosh Bhagwat has noted:

Edward Cavanagh, Antitrust Remedies Revisited, 84 OR. L. REV. 147, 181 (2005) ("The
enactment of the HSR legislation .. . revolutionized merger practice.").
62 See Bhagwat, supra note 60, at 1292 ("In practice, however, the HSR
predisclosure requirements, combined with other interim coercive powers created by the
Act, operate as a preclearance regime."); Warren S. Grimes, Transparency in Federal
Antitrust Enforcement, 51 BUFF. L. REV. 937, 945-47 (2003) ("For Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, what was judicially made law [pre-HSR] has now become much more
administrative law-law that is determined by the enforcement decisions of the two
federal agencies.").
63 See Joe Sims & Deborah P. Herman, The Effect of Twenty Years of Hart-ScottRodino on Merger Practice: A Case Study in the Law of Unintended Consequences
Applied to Antitrust Legislation, 65 ANTITRUST L.J. 865, 868 (1996-1997) (finding "preclosing leverage strongly favors the government"); Joe Sims & Michael McFalls,
Negotiated Merger Remedies: How Well Do They Solve Competition Problems?, 69 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 932, 942 (2001) (arguing that HSR results in significant negotiating
advantages for the government and thus disadvantages for merging parties). One
particular leverage point is time. Agencies will often prolong the approval process as a
means to leverage a favorable outcome. See Bhagwat, supra note 60, at 1295-96 ("The
great power conferred upon an agency by ex ante regulation is the power of delay. [A]
regulatory hold-up, if sufficiently long, can derail almost any significant merger.").
6 A "Second Request" is a request by the agencies for additional information from
the merging parties after the initial filing per the HSR. See Bhagwat, supra note 60, at
1292. The agencies will typically make a second request when there is a high likelihood
that the transaction will have anticompetitive effects. See Thomas J. Horton, Fixing
Merger Litigation "Fixes": Reforming the Litigation of Proposed Merger Remedies Under
Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 55 S.D. L. REV. 165, 195 (2010). While the second request
does not automatically mean that the transaction will be challenged by the agencies, it
signals to the parties that the agencies are concerned and also typically involves
substantial time and investment on the part of the merging parties to provide the
requisite documentation for the agencies. See id.
a A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13, 14 (1995);
see James T. Halverson & Ronald C. Wheeler, Negotiating Merger Consent Decrees, 2
ANTITRUST 23, 23-27 (1988) (discussing ways to negotiate with antitrust agencies);
Kolasky, Jr. & Lowe, supra note 61, at 901-02 (describing fix-it-first policy).
I Melamed, supra note 65.
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The critical differences between ex ante enforcement
mechanisms and the traditional, ex post mechanism
described ... lie in the timing of judicial review, and in the
placement of the burden of inertia and inaction. ... In an ex
ante regime ... [flailure to seek or gain agency approval, or
inaction by the agency, preclude the firm from pursuing desired
conduct, and therefore the burden of delay and inaction fall
entirely on the firm."
The ex ante nature of review provides space for agencies to
both direct parties and shape substantive antitrust law." Parties
seeking to avoid the costs and delay of litigation are effectively tied
to the agency's interpretation of the antitrust laws. Few will raise
substantive issues relating to antitrust doctrine before a court,
and, as a result, the antitrust agencies often have the last word on
whether
a particular
transaction
is anticompetitive."
Additionally, parties who maintain a positive relationship with the
agencies might fear challenging an agency's finding for fear of
future retaliation.
While HSR's initial ambitions were more
modest, the statute has given agencies leverage, vested by the
power of delay, to direct and control party behavior and has
provided a space through which agencies can interpret the
antitrust statutes more liberally or strictly than might otherwise
be permitted by the judicial system.

67

Bhagwat, supranote 60, at 1283.

6 See id. at 1279 ("The power of ex ante review provides an agency with an
enormous amount of substantive discretion to shape the policies it implements, as well as
a great deal of power to coerce or otherwise hold-up private, regulated entities.").
69 See Kolasky, Jr. & Lowe, supra note 61, at 898 (describing parties' reluctance to
challenge the FTC). Companies will also be reluctant to challenge a particular finding
because courts typically remand the case back down to the agency for findings consistent
with the judgment, adding additional delay and uncertainty. See Bhagwat, supra note
60, at 1297.
7o See Bhagwat, supra note 60, at 1297 ("[A] firm is often deterred from seeking
review because of the fear of agency retaliation in future proceedings. As a result, both
firms and agencies know that the threat of appeal is a hollow one."); Kolasky, Jr. & Lowe,
supra note 61, at 902 (describing informality between agencies and parties as crucial to
efficient and favorable outcome for all involved).
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2.

The Rise of the Consent Decree and a Dearth of Court
Precedent
The HSR Act also created spaces in which agencies and
transacting parties could negotiate and often settle any
anticompetitive concerns. 7 ' Today, most parties facing agency
review will settle.72 These settlements, memorialized in consent
decrees, are another vehicle through which the antitrust agencies
can shape merger enforcement law.73 In Silicon Graphics,4 for

n1 Where a complaint has already been filed, the challenging agency must obtain
approval for the settlement from either the presiding court or, in the case of an
administrative proceeding under the FTC Act, the ALJ. See Commission Statement to
Accompany Statement of Federal Trade Commission Policy Regarding Administrative
Merger Litigation Following the Denial of a Preliminary Injunction, 60 Fed. Reg. 39,742,
39,742 n.2 (Aug. 3, 1995) [hereinafter Commission Statement, Administrative Litigation]
(noting between FY 1990-1994, the Commission resolved complaints through
administrative consent orders in 67% of merger actions). Where the settlement is
negotiated prior to the filing of a complaint, the agencies are free to give form to the
terms without oversight or review. Note that even after a complaint is filed and the
settlement is subject to review, most courts and ALJs will approve the terms of the
settlement. Cf Grimes, supra note 62, at 961-62 (arguing that court review of
settlements "does precious little . .. to alter pre-existing judicial powers"). See generally
Lloyd C. Anderson, United States v. Microsoft, Antitrust Consent Decrees, and the Need
for a Proper Scope of Judicial Review, 65 ANrITRUST L.J. 1, 10-36 (1996-1997)
(reviewing history of Tunney Act litigation).
72 In 2009, for example, the FTC took twelve merger enforcement actions. See FED.
TRADE COMM'N & DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HART-SCOTr-RODINO ANNUAL REPORT 7 (2009),
available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports-annual/32st-reportfy-2009/101001hsrreport_0.pdf. Of these, six were resolved through consent decrees,
three transactions were withdrawn, three involved second request investigations without
further action, and in five, the FTC filed a preliminary injunction complaint. See id.;
ANTITRusT DIv., DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE 2006
AMENDMENTS
TO THE MERGER REVIEW
PROCESS
INrIATIVE 6 (2006),
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/220241.pdf ("In fiscal years 1999-2005 the Division
issued second requests in 248 merger investigations, but only 55 of those investigations
resulted in the filing of a complaint, and only four of those complaints led to a trial."); see
also Cavanagh, supra note 61, at 181-84 ("[D]isputes have been resolved
administratively through consent decrees in those cases where anticompetitive potential
existed."); Frankel, supra note 55, at 182-84 (noting how agency incentives favor
settlement); Melamed, supra note 65, at 13 (pointing to increasing use of consent decrees
at DOJ and FTC in early 1990s). Settlement comes in the form of either a consent decree
or agreement. See 16 C.F.R. § 2.34(c) (2013) (stating the FTC will publish consent decrees
and solicit comments). Similarly, the DOJ will also publish its consent decrees on the
Internet and invite comments. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012) (requiring DOJ decisions to
be published in the Federal Register).
1
See Sims & Herman, supra note 63, at 868 (finding "pre-closing leverage strongly
favors the government"); Sims & McFalls, supra note 63, at 942 (arguing that HSR
results in significant negotiating advantages for the government and thus disadvantages
for merging parties).
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example, the FTC procured a consent agreement after alleging
that the acquisition presented vertical foreclosure concerns, and
therefore violated section 5 and section 7."6 Commissioner Roscoe
B. Starek, III argues in his dissenting statement that "[v]ertical
foreclosure theories generally provide a weak basis for Section 7,"
and instead advocates that the FTC address the more horizontal
issues raised by the transaction. 6 Because a court never reviewed
Silicon Graphics, a theory of liability based on a theory of vertical
foreclosure continues to be a viable option for the FTC, even
though many economists and courts have critiqued vertical
foreclosure as a legitimate basis for antitrust liability. 8
Moreover, because consent decrees are by their very nature
contractual, they typically only concern the government agency
and merging parties. Even if the merger may have a ripple effect
on closely related parties or might prove damaging to those same
parties at a later date because of established consent decree
practices within the agencies, the settlement does not consider
third party concerns and may also ignore these future
consequences. 9 As discussed, parties care less about the effect a
consent decree will have on the substance of antitrust law and
more about closing a deal.80 While there are some safeguards in
" Silicon Graphics, Inc., Proposed Consent Agreement with Analysis to Aid
Public Comment, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,032, 35,032 (July 5, 1995).
7
See id. at 35,035.
7 See Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Roscoe B. Starek, III in the Matter of
Silicon Graphics, Inc., 60 Fed. Reg. 35,036, 35,036 (July 5, 1995).
" Although vertical foreclosure has some case support, see A.G. Spalding & Bros.,
Inc., 56 F.T.C. 1125, 1168 (1960), the issue has never been adequately addressed by a
federal court. Rather, the doctrine is confined to FTC consent decrees and administrative
proceedings. See Scott A. Stempel, Moving Beyond the '84 Guidelines: Government Shows
Increasing Concern with Vertical Mergers, 9 ANTITRUST 17, 17-18, 21-22 (1994)
(describing antitrust enforcement agencies' rising concerns over vertical mergers and
subsequent use of consent decrees to combat them).
78 For a discussion of vertical foreclosures and its critiques, see ROBERT H. BORK,
THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 232-34 (1993); David Reiffen

& Michael Vita, Comment, Is There New Thinking on Vertical Mergers?, 63 ANTITRUST
L.J. 917, 917-23 (1995).
79 See Kolasky, Jr. & Lowe, supra note 61, at 893 ("In calculating the costs and
benefits of a consent decree, the parties to a transaction are likely to take into account
only the effects on their own transaction, and not the effects on third parties. This may
cause them to agree to relief that the agency would not be able to obtain in litigation in
order to close the transaction expeditiously.").
80 See supra notes 64-66, 68-70 and accompanying text (describing the pressures
placed on parties facing agency review).
The reality is that very few transactions can afford the delay inherent in
litigating, even through a preliminary injunction, and even fewer parties
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place, none are controlling-in other words, agencies can easily
bypass them." As a result, consent decrees provide a unique
avenue through which the agencies can shape merger enforcement
law while offering favorable deals to transacting parties. 2

have the stomach for the additional legal fees entailed in such litigation.
Moreover, taking the antitrust agencies to court, in effect, inverts the
pyramid that provides the fundamental rationale for appeal mechanisms
generally... . Most businesses prefer the certainty of dealing with two
federal enforcement agencies to the risks associated in having any one of
several hundred federal judges deciding their cases.
Kolasky, Jr. & Lowe, supra note 61, at 910-11.
8 See supra note 71 (noting that obtaining court approval for settlements is not
burdensome). Where a complaint has been filed, a third party may seek to intervene in
the dispute where its interests are adversely affected. See, e.g., Intervenor Hollingsworth
& Vose Co.'s Brief on Remedies Affecting Its Contractual Rights at *4, Polypore
International, Inc., No. 9327, 2009 WL 3328240 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Oct. 1, 2009)
("Remedies imposed by the Commission must bear a 'reasonable relation to the unlawful
practices found to exist,'" and in this instance, went beyond the scope thereby causing
harm to petitioner (quoting FTC v. Nat'l Lead Co., 352 U.S. 419, 428 (1957))); Ky.
Household Goods Carrier Ass'n, 139 F.T.C. 404, 406 (2004) (Chappell, A.L.J.)).
Additionally, both the FTC and the DOJ submit consent decrees for public comment
before they come into force, but agencies are not required to take public comment into
consideration or change their consent decree based on the dissenting voices. See Margo
Schlanger, Against Secret Regulation: Why and How We Should End the Practical
Obscurity ofInjunctions and Consent Decrees, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 515, 524 (2010).
82 See Sims & Herman, supra note 63, at 887-88, 896-99 (tracking use of consent
decrees to pressure parties to cede to agency wishes); Kolasky, Jr. & Lowe, supra note 61,
at 910-11; cf E. Thomas Sullivan, The Antitrust Division as a Regulatory Agency: An
Enforcement Policy in Transition,64 WASH. U. L. Q. 997, 1051-52 (1986) (acknowledging
the benefit of a consent decree). Consent decrees have not only given substance to merger
enforcement law, but have also changed the shape of merger remedies not otherwise
found through court orders. See Kolasky, Jr. & Lowe, supra note 61, at 892-93 (arguing
reliance on consent decrees results in greater "use of regulatory provisions, such as
mandatory licensing, non-discriminatory access, and firewalls to prevent the flow of
competitively-sensitive information"); see also Mary Lou Steptoe & David Balto, Finding
the Right Prescription:The FTC's Use of Innovative Merger Remedies, 10 ANTITRUST 16,
16-20 (1995) (describing new forms of remedies negotiated between agencies and
merging parties). For example, under an enforcement regime that relies on consent
decrees, remedies are elusive; some legal scholars have even suggested that consent
decrees should consider including post-merger pricing guidelines. See Farrell Malone &
J. Gregory Sidak, Should Antitrust Consent Decrees Regulate Post-Merger Pricing?,3 J.
COMPETITION L. & ECON. 471, 471, 486-88 (2007) (stating that "[ilt is surprising,
however, that there are no well-defined principles for what merger remedies-divestiture
or other alternatives-should enter a consent decree," and continuing to argue
possibilities of post-merger pricing within consent decrees).
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3.

A Dearth of Court Precedent and Greater Deference to
Agency Procedures
The development of "new" merger enforcement law as
proscribed by the antitrust agencies occurs at two levels. First,
agencies can use consent decrees as a means of developing new
forms of liability,' as well as new remedies not necessarily
available through court orders." Second, agencies can expand or
contract the scope of liability by changing the relevant factors of
analysis on a case-by-case basis. 5 Both of these methods operate,
to some extent, through the agencies' Merger Guidelines.
The degree to which the agencies have been successful in
formulating the scope of liability publicly-since consent decrees
also permit reformulation behind closed doors-is a consequence of
the agencies' Merger Guidelines.86 As Hillary Greene argues, the
Merger Guidelines "have acted as a stealth force on the
development of antitrust merger law" and have had an "undue
influence upon common law development.""
The influence Merger Guidelines have had on actual court
interpretations of merger enforcement law is not entirely clear. In
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.," the Supreme Court held that "rulings,
interpretations and opinions" of a federal agency, "while not
controlling ... do constitute a body of experience and informed
judgment to which courts and litigants may properly resort for
guidance."" Although the Merger Guidelines are not controlling,"

" See Silicon Graphics, Inc., Proposed Consent Agreement with Analysis to Aid
Public Comment, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,032, 35,032 (July 5, 1995) (illustrating a consent
decree that went beyond the scope of court liability); supra notes 74-78 and
accompanying text (explaining consent decree in Silicon Graphics as one that went
beyond the scope of court liability).
84 See supra note 82 and accompanying text (enumerating ways consent decrees give
agencies greater flexibility in choice of remedies).
I See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text (describing the development of
Merger Guidelines and the evolution of merger enforcement law).
8 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 1; see also Greene, supra
note 47, at 779-80 (explaining how merger guidelines clearly convey enforcement policies
to the public).
8 See Greene, supra note 47, at 772; see also Thomas B. Leary, The Essential
Stability of Merger Policy in the United States, 70 ANTITRUsT L.J. 105, 114 (2002)
(observing common themes in the historical versions of Merger Guidelines).
8
323 U.S. 134 (1944).
89 Id. at 140; see Greene, supra note 47, at 817-21 (describing how Skidmore set the
groundwork for extensive reliance on Merger Guidelines by courts in evaluating
antitrust cases).
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courts have relied more heavily on the agencies' Merger
Guidelines in recent years9 ' because of the lack of recent case law,
a consequence of the HSR Act.
Although important to an understanding of how agencies can
shape law, Merger Guidelines are not frequently reviewed or used
by courts because of the rarity of merger litigation. Additionally,
insofar as the Merger Guidelines diverge from court practice,
courts will be less willing to adopt the Merger Guidelines as
influential. Central to the changing form of merger enforcement is
not the mere ability of agencies to use Merger Guidelines to affect
merger enforcement, but the lack of judicial review." While the
possibility of litigation always lingers in the backdrop and deters

" See, e.g., M. Tool Works, Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28, 45 (2006) (describing
Guidelines as helpful but not controlling on the court).
9
For general discussion of use of Merger Guidelines by courts, see Kolasky, Jr. &
Lowe, supra note 61, at 899 nn.51 & 53, 900-01 ("They provide antitrust practitioners
and the business community with a detailed description of the methodology the agencies
use to evaluate proposed acquisitions, the relevant factors they consider, and the
standards they apply. By revising the guidelines as the agencies' approach has changed,
the agencies have kept the public fully apprised of those changes."). For cases illustrating
reliance, see, for example, Ill. Tool Works, Inc., 547 U.S. at 45 (using enforcement
guidelines as persuasive although "not binding on the Court" in its assessment of market
power); United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 505-07 (1974) (adopting
similar structural approach to merger as promulgated in 1968 Merger Guidelines);
United States v. Phila. Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 390-91 (1963) (adopting clear merger
rules as a precursor to Merger Guidelines); Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 509 F. Supp. 115,
124-26 (D. Del. 1981) (relying on Guidelines for both market concentration analysis and
standard). See generally Greene, supra note 47, at 784-87, 802-09 (describing case law
supporting and rejecting use of Guidelines as persuasive in court and the general
influence of the Merger Guidelines).
9
The infrequency of suit means that case law is significantly underdeveloped
or at least not directly responsive or relevant to today's economy. See Cavanagh,
supra note 61, at 183-84 (noting that "[t]he vast majority of judicial precedent in the
merger area, which developed in the 1950s and 1960s, is largely irrelevant to merger
practice today" and that "[t]he Supreme Court decided the last substantive merger case
under section 7 of the Clayton Act ... over thirty years ago" (citing Gen. Dynamics Corp.,
415 U.S. at 486)).
93 See Bhagwat, supra note 60, at 1298 ("Many commentators have noted that
the passage of the HSR, and the coercive Second Requests it authorized, has
eviscerated judicial review of merger policy. Other examples are more difficult to
document since they are primarily evidenced by the absence of judicial decisions, but
common sense and casual empiricism suggest that in the face of ex ante regulation,
judicial review is often utterly impractical from the point of view of regulated
firms.").
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agencies from diverging wildly from accepted practices, reasonable
interpretations of the statutes will likely receive some degree of
judicial deference.94
B. A Place for Section 5 and the FTC
Changes in merger enforcement have given greater credence
to the possibility of an independent section 5 theory of liability.
Although both the DOJ and the FTC are privy to the changes in
merger enforcement law, the FTC has two things the DOJ does
not: (1) the option of bringing a complaint before an administrative
law judge, appeals of which are received by none other than the
Commissioners who brought the complaint in the first place, and
(2) the statutory hook of section 5.9

4 See generally id. at 1307 ("Not only have the antitrust agencies been effectively
'making law' pursuant to their pre-review powers under HSR, but since the passage of
HSR in 1976 the various Guidelines and other agency internal policies have become
essentially the only law governing such mergers because of the absence of any judicial (or
congressional) activity in this area."). Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or

Public Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It
Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 702 (2007) ("Chevron's framework encourages judge-

made ossification of regulatory statutes ... .Because of their lasting impact through
stare decisis, and because they can be broad and abstract, judicial holdings that find
fixed meaning in regulatory statutes can deprive agencies of needed flexibility to change
course in the future."); Malcolm R. Pfunder, Some Reflections on, and Modest Proposals
for Reform of the Hart-Scott-RodinoPremergerNotification Program,65 ANTTRUST L.J.

905, 907-08 (1996-1997); David S. Rubenstein, "Relative Checks": Towards Optimal
Control ofAdministrative Power, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2169, 2183 (2010) ('The power

to interpret statutes in the administrative state . .. carries with it the power to make
policy choices that Congress itself has not." (internal quotation marks omitted)). While
there is literature describing both the benefits and harms resulting from the HSR Act,
the advent of the consent decrees, and the general lack of court oversight, this Article is
not concerned with whether a stronger administrative regulatory state is good or bad.
Rather, it not only seeks to consider how these new structural and procedural facts
create space for the agencies to develop new merger enforcement law but also allows the
FTC to go even further through the use of section 5. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 60, at
1275-79 (considering the positives, negatives, and dangers associated with ex ante and ex
post administrative states); Frankel, supra note 55, at 159-60 (critiquing asymmetric
access to judicial review in antitrust law); Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for
Politicsin Arbitraryand CapriciousReview, 119 YALE L.J. 2 (2009) (arguing for greater
administrative review).
15 See supra notes 55-94 and accompanying text (providing a narrative of
structural changes within antitrust law relating to mergers).
6 See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012); see also infra notes 98110 and accompanying text (describing FTC procedural differences).
9
15 U.S.C. § 45.
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Expanding Use of the Administrative Adjudication Process
In recent years, the FTC has exercised its right to bring a
complaint before an administrative law judge with greater
Historically, both agencies would file for a
frequency.18
preliminary injunction, and the DOJ would also file for a
If the injunction was denied, the
permanent injunction."
transaction would, pending other non-antitrust issues, close.
Although the DOJ is legally bound by the courts' preliminary and
permanent injunction rulings, the FTC is not so bound. 00
When the DOJ challenges a merger, it alleges that the
transaction violates section 7.101 Parties know that a preliminary
and permanent injunction will only be granted if a district court
determines that the DOJ has demonstrated by a preponderance of
the evidence that the challenged transaction will "substantially
lessen competition." 0 2 Consequently, the DOJ is more confined to
current antitrust law doctrine if only because parties may have
1.

" See Darren S. Tucker & Amanda P. Reeves, Effective Advocacy Before the
Commission, ANTITRUST, Summer 2010, at 52, 52 ("The Commission's active docket,
combined with the likely upturn in merger activity, suggests that there will be more
matters in which parties will be appearing before the Commission in the future."); cf D.
Bruce Hoffman & M. Sean Royall, Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Past, Present,
and Future, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 319, 328 (2003-2004) ("The Commission's current
extensive use of administrative litigation may certainly be viewed as consistent with the
idea that complex issues are particularly appropriate for [FTC1 adjudication.").
* Unlike the FTC, the DOJ must request a preliminary and permanent injunction
concurrently. The DOJ must therefore meet a heightened preponderance of the evidence
standard before obtaining a preliminary injunction. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F.
Supp. 2d 1098, 1109 (N.D. Cal. 2004); ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note
24, at 138-42.
100 The procedural differences between the FTC and the DOJ have been subject to
scrutiny. See ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 24, at 127-42 (describing
and recommending changes to current procedural differences merging parties face).
However, given the perceived lack of real substantive difference, no effort has been made
to change the differing procedures. See Matt Andrejczak, Federal TrustbustersAbandon
Pact: Justice, FTC Succumb to Budget Threats, MARKET WATCH (May 21, 2002, 10:49
AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/federal-trustbusters-abandon-merger-reviewpact (describing failed Merger Clearance Agreement).
101 See, e.g., Cengage Learning Holding I, L.P., Proposed Final Judgment and
Competitive Impact Statement, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,948, 34,950 (Fed. Trade Comm'n June
19, 2008) (portraying challenged acquisition as one that would "substantially lessen
competition in interstate trade and commerce in violation of section 7 of the Clayton
Act").
102 See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012); supra note 101-103 and accompanying text (describing
the evidentiary standard of the DOJ).
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stronger incentives to not settle before a preliminary injunction
motion is filed: If the DOJ's request is denied, the transaction can
10
go forward as planned.o
The FTC, on the other hand, has the added advantage of an
administrative procedure and the section 5 statutory hook.104 The
existence of an administrative proceeding means that the FTC is
less constrained by the courts and, in recent years, the FTC has
preferred the administrative adjudication route.' 0 5 Even if a court
were to reject a request for a preliminary injunction, the FTC
administrative proceeding can proceed concurrently with a
preliminary injunction hearing or even after the preliminary
injunction has been denied. 0 6
Moreover, recent cases have
lowered the standard of review under which courts will examine
the findings of the FTC in its request for a preliminary injunction
and the standard of review of its findings after an appeal from an
ALJ's decision.'
1o3 Jeffrey W. Brennan & Sean P. Pugh, Inova and the FTC's Revamped Merger

Litigation Model, ANTITRUST, Fall 2008, at 28, 31 (noting that a "preliminary injunction
'almost always kills the deal' " (citation omitted)).
104 See 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012).
10 See Janet L. McDavid & Richard G. Parker, Recent Federal Agency Antitrust

Merger Enforcement, in MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS: WHAT You NEED To KNow Now
123, 152-54 (2009) (pointing to the FTC's efforts to encourage adjudication through
administrative proceeding); FTC Seeks Comments on Proposed Amendments to Its Rules
of Practice Regarding Adjudicative Proceedings, FED. TRADE COMMISSION (Sept. 25,
2008), http/www.ftc.gov/opa/2008/09/nprmpt3.shtm (expediting adjudicative process
with an aim to shift litigating challenged mergers toward adjudicative proceedings).
16 In its Statement of Policy, the Commission notes that "a preliminary injunction
proceeding, regardless of its outcome, may not in and of itself provide a sufficient basis
for the resolution of complex merger litigation," and that "it would not be in the public
interest to forego an administrative trial solely because a preliminary injunction has
been denied." Commission Statement, Administrative Litigation, supra note 71, at
39742-43. In recent years, changes to the FTC's administrative procedural rules have
addressed previous criticisms that the FTC review took significantly longer than the
DOJ procedure. See Comments of the Section of Antitrust Law of the American Bar
Association in Response to the Antitrust Modernization Commission's Request for Public
Comment Regarding Government Enforcement Institutions: Differential Merger
Enforcement Standards,AM. BAR ASS'N 9 (Oct. 28, 2005), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/abaladministrativelantitrust_1aw/comments-mergerenfrcstandards1005-comm.authcheckdam.pdf (administrative litigation following preliminary injunction
"forced [parties] into a long and costly process"); Proposed Rules: Federal Trade
Commission, 73 Fed. Reg. 58,832, 58,837 (Oct. 7, 2008).
107 In other words, the FTC has even greater leverage in the negotiating process
because parties are assured that if a preliminary injunction is filed, there is a high
likelihood that it will be issued, further prolonging the merger or acquisition and
potentially killing the transaction entirely. See FTC v. Whole Foods Market, Inc., 548
F.3d 1028, 1035 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (adopting a serious questions test for the FTC review);
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The administrative proceeding gives the FTC more leverage
than the DOJ to successfully challenge mergers or to otherwise
enter a favorable consent decree with the parties even when the
transaction may not be problematic from a court's perspective. 0 s
In other words, merger enforcement law, as understood by the
courts, is less of a constraining force on the FTC than it is on the
DOJ.os Even if a preliminary injunction is denied and the parties
are free to enter into the proposed merger, the FTC might still
choose to bring a challenge before an ALJ, thus creating a
sufficient deterrent for parties to consummate the deal.110
A Statutory Hook
The added buttress afforded by an administrative proceeding
is not particularly alarming standing alone. An ALJ, much like a
district court judge, can quickly assess the allegations, determine
whether the agency's case is a viable one under current antitrust
doctrine, and make a determination accordingly. But, because the
complaint alleges both FTC Act section 5 and Clayton Act section
7 violations, an AL has greater flexibility. "I
Existing case law and literature speaking to the differences
and relationship between section 7 and section 5 is stark." 2
Earlier cases suggest that section 5 can and should be read more
2.

FTC v. CCC Holdings Inc., 605 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D.D.C. 2009) (interpreting Whole
Foods and affirming lower standard); Nathan Chubb, supra note 14, at 554-59
(describing effect of lowered standard on agency review). For more discussion, see
generally, Jessica Fricke, Note, FTC v. Whole Foods Market. A New FTC Preliminary
Injunction Standard?,8 DEPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 173 (2010); David Pettit, Comment,
Submarkets and Supermarkets: FTC v. Whole Foods Market and the Resurrection of
Brown Shoe, 16 GEO. MASON L. REv. 971 (2009).
10 See Tucker & Reeves, supra note 98, at 52-54 (describing Commission review
process).
0 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supranote 24, at 138.
no See, e.g., Hoffman & Royall, supra note 98, at 328 ("The merger bar, in
particular, may view MSC.Software and ChicagoBridge as both unusual and important
in that they involve efforts to unwind consummated mergers that were discovered to be
anticompetitive after the fact.").
..
n See, e.g., Proctor & Gamble Co., 140 F.T.C. 944, 951 (2005) (charging that the
acquisition "constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act" and "if consummated,
would constitute a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act"); see also Stephanie W.
Kanwit, Federal Trade Commission Enforcement of Section 7 of the Clayton ActMergers and Pre-merger Notification Rules, 1 F.T.C. § 17:1 (2012) ("Section 5
counts ... are routinely included, along with § 7 counts, in FTC challenges to mergers or
acquisitions.").
112 See infra notes 184-200 and accompanying text (examining limiting case law for
merger enforcement).
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liberally than section 7, but these cases also do not provide any
limits or guidance as to the outer boundaries of the section 5
power in the context of mergers.1 13 ALJs, therefore, may choose to
constrain section 5 to section 7 doctrine or may choose to adopt a
more liberalized view of section 5 in cases where the transaction
may not be subject to section 7 or where a decision might fall
outside current section 7 precedent.114 Further, because ALJs are
appointed by the Commissioners, we may have greater concerns
that ALJs may do the latter. Perhaps evidencing this point, the
Commission has, in some instances, appointed one of its own
members as an ALJ."is
Section 5 therefore provides the FTC and its appointed ALJs a
safe harbor if and when they choose to expand current merger
antitrust doctrine. While section 5 allegations are added to
complaints as a matter of course, the growing number of cases
that are settled or resolved by the FTC administrative process
under the auspices of section 5 means that, insofar as consent

n1 See infra notes 147-54 and accompanying text (discussing case law that suggests
FTC section 5 is and can be construed more broadly than section 7 of the Clayton Act);
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986) ( 'The standard of'unfairness'...
is, by necessity, an elusive one, encompassing not only practices that violate the
Sherman Act and the other antitrust laws, but also practices that the Commission
determines are against public policy for other reasons." (internal citations omitted)).
14 See Kanwit, supra note 111 (finding that the Commission noted that section 5
"reaches all mergers which violate the standards set forth in § 7 of the Clayton Act, even
if for technical reasons the acquisition would not be subject to the Clayton Act.").
1" See Order Designating Administrative Law Judge, Inova Health Sys. Found.,
FTC Docket No. 9326 (May 8, 2008), available at http/A/www.ftc.gov/os/adjprol
d9326/080509order.pdf (appointing Commissioner Rosch as ALJ for Inova hearing);
Respondent's Motion to Disqualify the Commission as Administrative Law Judge and To
Appoint a Presiding Official Other than a Commissioner, Whole Foods Market, Inc., FTC
Docket No. 9324 (Aug. 22, 2008), available at http-//ftc.gov/ostadjpra/d9324/
080822respmodisqualifycomm.pdf (arguing that benefits of having Commissioner serve
as ALJ in Inova are not present here); see also Brennen & Pugh, supra note 103, at 2829 (noting that practice of appointing Commissioner as ALJ is departure from past
practice). In Inova, the parties ultimately pulled out of the transaction. See Press
Release, Inova Health Sys., Statement from Inova Health Sys. and Prince William
Health Sys. About the Proposed Merger (June 6, 2008), available at
httpJ/www.inovanewsroom.org/statement-from-inova-health-system-and-prince-williamhealth-system-about-the-proposed-merger/ ("A challenge and unusual process changes by
the Federal Trade Commission threatened to prolong completion of the merger by as
much as two years, which both health systems believe is not in the best interest of the
communities they serve.").
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decrees give form and establish precedent or otherwise expand
merger enforcement, section 5 can provide a statutory justification
for expansion. 16
While it is not exactly clear how or in what direction the
Commission hopes to use section 5 to expand merger
enforcement,'17 the Commission has a clear mission of expansion
in mind."' Over the course of the last decade, the FTC has
116 Most FTC complaints allege both FTC section 5 and Clayton Act section
7
violations, but the discussion of anticompetitive effects and barriers to entry that give the
allegation substance reference neither section. For example, in the recent Novartis case,
the FTC alleged that "[elntry into the relevant markets ... would not be timely, likely, or
sufficient in its magnitude, character, and scope to deter or counteract the
anticompetitive effects of the Acquisition" and that the transaction would "substantially
lessen competition . . . in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act . . . and Section 5 of the
FTC Act ... by eliminating actual, direct, and substantial competition between Novartis
and Alcon." Complaint at 9-10, Novartis AG, FTC Docket No. C-4296 (Aug. 16, 2010),
available at http-//ftc.gov/os/caselist/1010068/100816novartiscmpt.pdf.
117 See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
118 Under Leibowitz's
leadership, the FTC has pursued a rigorous merger
enforcement policy. See McDavid & Parker, supra note 105, at 149-50 ('The FTC will
likely expand its involvement in proposed mergers under Leibowitz's Chairmanship."). In
his concurring opinion In the Matter of Rambus, Leibowitz stated:
[T]he framers of the FTC Act gave the Agency a mandate-one unique to
the Commission-to use Section 5 to supplement and bolster the antitrust
laws by providing, in essence, a jurisdictional 'penumbra' around
them .... [Wie need to ... further develop this aspect of our enforcement
responsibility-and to use all the arrows in our jurisdictional quiver to
ensure that competition is robust, innovative, and beneficial to consumers.
Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Jon Leibowitz at 21, Rambus, Inc., FTC Docket No.
9302 (Aug. 2, 2006), available at http//www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/
Commissioner
2006/08/060802rambusconcurringopinionofcommissionerleibowitz.pdf.
Rosch has been particularly active in efforts to expand the reach of section 5 in the area
of mergers and the Clayton Act. See Jonathan Gleklen, The Emerging Antitrust
Philosophy of FTC Commissioner Rosch, ANTITRUST, Spring 2009, at 46, 46. In his
concurring opinion in Ovation, Rosch pointed to previous conglomerate cases as
justification for an expanded section 5 power. Id. Commissioner Rosch has advocated for
an "unprecedented expansion of Section 5" and that this approach was "coupled with a
push to broaden the reach of Section 7 substantively beyond existing precedent." Id.; see
Mark D. Whitener, Interview with J. Thomas Rosch, Commissioner, Federal Trade
Commission, ANTITRUST, Spring 2009, at 32, 39 (appealing to old conglomerate cases,
dissenting in Ovation decision); Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other
Equitable Relief, FIC v. Ovation Phams., Inc., No. 0:2008cv06379 (D. Minn, Dec. 16,
2008), available at http//www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documentscases/2008/12081216
ovationcmpt.pdf.
From Kovacic's view, section 5 has been constrained beyond its original purpose, but,
unlike Rosch and Leibowtiz, Kovacic believes that these court constraints have been a
product of the Commission's own failures and seeks to remedy the Commission's past
errors in adopting a new path for section 5 jurisprudence. William E. Kovacic & Marc
Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 929, 94(-50 (2009-2010) (advocating that the
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successfully isolated itself procedurally whereby, either through
consent decree or administrative proceeding, it has paved a path
for an independent line of section 5 cases.'
C. Some Initial Concerns
The growing use of consent decrees under HSR procedures
creates a growing divide between merger enforcement in practice
and merger enforcement as understood by the courts. 2 0 At the
same time, the availability of the administrative proceeding and
the statutory hook of section 5 has the potential to create, and has
arguably created, a divide between the FTC and the DOJ in the
enforcement of their Merger Guidelines and antitrust laws.12 '
These shifts raise a number of concerns.
First, a division between antitrust doctrine in practice and
antitrust doctrine as understood by judicial precedent raises
general concerns of accountability and transparency of the
decision-making processes.' 22 As William J. Kolasky, Jr. and
Commission learn from historical experience and expand section 5 in a principled,
standardized manner). For Kovacic, expansive FTC power is possible through
legitimizing the administrative litigation proceeding and otherwise justilying decisions
based on principled standards and rules. Kovacic noted that "[tihe Inova/Prince William
Health System transaction is a good example of how the agency has learned and applied
very useful lessons though a process of critical self assessment concerning experience
[with prior case law]," and praised the Whole Foods and Chicago Bridge cases as
providing "useful foundations for future FTC merger enforcement." Elizabeth M. Bailey,
Interview with William E. Kovacic, Chairman, Federal Trade Commission, THE
ANTITRUST SOURCE 4-5 (Aug. 2008), http/www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publishinglantitrust source/AugO8_FullSource8_6f.authcheckdam.pdf.
The remaining two commissioners, Commissioner Julie Brill and Chairwoman Edith
Ramirez, were sworn in on April 2010 and it is unclear where they will stand on the
debate. See Julie Brill, Commissioner, FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http//ftc.gov/
commissioners/brill/mdex.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2014); Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman,
FED. TRADE COMMISSION, http//ftc.gov/commissioners/ramirezlindex.shtml (last visited
Mar. 9, 2014).
n9 See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text (discussing advent of consent
decree in context of administrative proceedings); see also Evanston Nw. Healthcare
Corp., No. 9315, 2007 WL 2286195, at *62 (Fed. Trade Comm'n Aug. 6, 2007) (noting
that, in a consummated merger, "our analysis is a retrospective inquiry based on
empirical evidence" of competitive effects); Hoffman & Royall, supra note 98, at 331
(describing expanding procedural devices, including bringing claims post-merger, and
noting that "[ilt seems likely that the Commission's extensive use of administrative
litigation to resolve important and difficult antitrust issues will continue for the
foreseeable future").
120 See supraPart IHA.
121 See infra Part
IfE.B.
122 See, e.g., Grimes, supra note 62, at 939 ("Although both agencies disclose a great
deal of information ... their record in publishing information about enforcement

2013]

FTC SECTION 5 MERGER DOCTRINE

979

James W. Lowe argue, "The lack of meaningful opportunity for
judicial review in the overwhelming majority of cases imposes a
special obligation on the [antitrust] agencies to behave fairly and
Because this Article is less concerned with
responsibly."1 23
theories of agency and administrative law, the issue of
transparency is less relevant, particularly where the "clients" of
the agencies are often well-represented and sophisticated
corporations. 12 4 However, differences between the DOJ and the
FTC as to the transparency of decisions are problematic insofar as
the agencies apply different standards and rules. Although both
agencies "follow" the Merger Guidelines, these guidelines merely
provide a framework without describing dispositive factors.'2 5
While both agencies have improved their reasons for challenging a
merger and their ability to articulate claims through complaints,
the DOJ still provides a more "detailed and useful" statement of
impact than the FTC.'26 As noted before, an ALJ's decision or
FTC's complaint will reference both section 7 of the Clayton Act
and section 5 of the FTC Act,12 7 but the analysis and conclusion
will most likely reference neither.128 Consequently, there is not
only less transparency in the basis of an FTC challenge, but also
little to no transparency as to whether a particular decision is
based on how the FTC distinguishes section 5 or section 7.
Second, and on a related note, we might worry that parties
are facing both different procedural and substantive standards
when their transactions are reviewed. As discussed, whether a
decisions is problematic."); Watts, supra note 94 (arguing that agencies must be more
transparent about political motivations and pressures).
123 Kolasky, Jr. & Lowe, supra note 61, at 911.
124 HSR only requires pre-merger filings for transactions that meet the following(1) the transaction affects commerce; (2) either (a) one of the parties has sales each year
or assets of $100 million or more [as of 2008, raised to $126.3 million] and the other party
has sales or assets of $12.6 million or more; or (b) the amount of stock the acquirer has is
valued at $252.3 million or more at any time; and (3) the value of the transaction is $63.1
million or more. See 15 U.S.C. § 18a (2012).
125 See Kolasky, Jr. & Lowe, supra note 61, at 903 (noting changes in merger
guideless toward "a more nuanced analysis of the likely competitive effects of a merger,
driven by the economists, leaves businesses and their advisors at sea in predicting
whether the agency will challenge a particular transaction").
126 Id. at 894 ("lTihe FTC, while doing a better job of explaining the bases for its
decisions, still lags behind its sister agency, the DOJ, in that area. The DOJ's
Competitive Impact Statements are far more detailed and useful than the FTC's
Analyses in Aid of Public Comment.").
127 See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
128 See infra notes 184-200 and accompanying text.
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merger is reviewed by the DOJ or the FTC is largely a matter of
industry. 12 9
Because of the procedural changes in merger
enforcement, a party facing FTC review might unknowingly be
subject to an independent section 5 claim couched within a
traditional Clayton Act complaint or challenge-a challenge that
would pose no concerns for a party facing review by the DOJ.
Although courts have typically afforded the FTC flexibility in its
enforcement of section 5,130 flexibility can also result in business
confusion and the view that decisions are made arbitrarily if
parties are not subject to the same standards of review.
The lack of transparency as to how section 5 affects the FTC's
review of a merger is a challenge which all parties subject to FTC
review must deal with. Over the course of the past few years, the
FTC has pursued a rigorous merger enforcement docket, 13 but the
lack of transparency in FTC review means that practitioners and
academics alike must infer from single cases how the FTC intends
to analyze a particular transaction.13 2 It is an added factor, not
relevant to the DOJ, and one that is particularly subject to critique
as arbitrary or unfair.'3 3
III. THE FTC: GROWING UP AND TESTING THE BOUNDARIES
Over the course of the past century, both the antitrust
agencies and courts have struggled to shape the contours of
section 5.134
As discussed, through the HSR pre-merger
12'See supra Part II.B.1 (highlighting the FTC and the DOJ's historical
experience and advantages of each).
130 See Jeff Sovern, Private Actions Under the Deceptive
Trade Practices Acts:
Reconsidering the F7C Act as Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 437, 443-44 & n.41 (1991)
(outlining the history of judicial deference afforded to the FTC).
131 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HART-SCOrT-RODINo ANNUAL
REPORT: FISCAL YEAR 2011, at 5 (2011) ("[Tlhe number of merger investigations in
which second requests were issued in fiscal year 2011 increased 26% from the
number of merger investigations in which second requests were issued in fiscal year
2010.").
132 See Ilene Knable Gotts, M&A Antitrust Enforcement in FY 2010: Are the
Obama Officials Promoting a New or a Souped Up Model of Enforcement?,
ANTITRUST REP., 2010, at 4 (examining recent FTC actions at the boundaries of
antitrust doctrine).
133 See Bhagwat, supra note 60, at 1304 ("In addition to the problems of generalized
arbitrariness and lack of supervision, the existence of ex ante enforcement authority also
raises substantial issues regarding an agency's substantive powers to make and interpret
law. Here may lie the greatest danger resulting from the increased discretionary power
generated by preclearance authority.").
134 Although the arguments for independent section 5
merger liability are not novel,
they take different forms in changing contexts, evolving as the U.S. has faced new
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notification requirements and the FTC's administrative and
statutory advantages, section 5 has likely taken its own shape
within the merger context.1 5 However, Article III courts have yet
to acknowledge an expansive section 5.116 In this Part, the Article
will track the history of section 5 and its changing relationship to
section 7. Part III.A provides the historical backgrounds of section
5 and section 7. Part III.B considers the proposed use of section 5
to target conglomerate mergers of the 1960s and 70s.'13

Finally,

Part III.C examines recent cases that have interpreted section 7
and section 5 narrowly.'
A.

The FTC and Clayton Acts

1.

FTC Section 5
Although section 5 was initially touted and passed as an allencompassing antitrust statute,' the FTC's efforts to expand
liability have been unsuccessful. 140
Despite some earlier
successes, 141 courts have largely interpreted section 5 as mere

economic challenges. See infra Part II.A (describing the new context in which these
arguments are made). Despite the arguments for and against expanded section 5
liability, most recognize that section 5 does have some role outside of the Clayton and
Sherman Acts. Averitt, supra note 13, at 228 (noting that "language of Section 5 was
deliberately left broad and general" and courts have had to determine its scope "through
a process of case-by-case construction"); Creighton et al., supra note 16, at 2 (arguing
that section 5 enforcement should consist of "frontier' cases, 'gap-filling' cases and 'yes,
but' cases"); Layne E. Kruse, Deconcentration and Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, 46 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 200, 202-10 (1978) (examining whether section
5 should cover shared monopolies); see also infra notes 164-83 and accompanying text
(examining the argument that section 5 should cover conglomerate mergers).
135 See supra notes 55-72 (explaining the role of the HSR in changing merger
enforcement).
136 See infra Part III.C (describing how courts have limited the scope of the
Clayton Act, and with it, section 5).
137 See infra notes 163-83 and accompanying text (discussing conglomerate cases
and early legislative efforts to address the perceived conglomerate epidemic).
138 See infra notes 184-200 and accompanying text (describing recent case law
narrowly construing section 7 and giving agencies less deference).
' See infra Part III.A.1.a-b (discussing legislative history of section 5 and
examining case law that suggested section 5 should be interpreted broadly).
140 See infra Part III.C (describing how courts have limited the scope of the Clayton
Act, and with it, section 5).
141 See, e.g., FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 249-50 (1972); FTC v.
Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 322 (1966).
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surplusage in section 7 cases. This Section of the Article will
examine the congressional history of section 5 and describe the
courts' early reception of expansive section 5 liability.
a.

CongressionalPurpose of Section 5

The FTC Act was passed in 1914, establishing the Federal
Trade Commission as an independent agency for the purposes of
hearing and adjudicating antitrust cases under the Sherman and
Clayton Acts.142 It also provided the FTC, under section 5, with
the power to challenge "[u]nfair methods of competition in or
affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce."143

15 U.S.C. § 45(b)-(n) (2012) (describing the procedure and remedies of the FTC
administrative proceedings). Unlike the Antitrust Division at the DOJ, the FTC was set
up as a bipartisan administrative agency, and thus, less subject to the demands of the
Executive Branch. Id. §§ 41-58 (describing selection of Commissioners and their term).
m Id. § 45(a)(1). The terms "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting
commerce" were not originally in the FTC Act. It was not until 1938, with the WhellerLea amendment, that those terms were included. See Cartensen & Questal, supra note
13, at 853. According to the text of the statute, the FTC must evidence harm to
consumers and may consider established public policies in determining whether any
given practice is "unfair." 15 U.S.C. § 45(n) (detailing the Commission's standard of
proof). In order to find any given practice unfair, the Commission must evidence that it
"causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably
avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to
consumers or to competition." Id. By way of background, the FTC Act was largely a
Congressional and Executive response to the Supreme Court's Standard Oil Co. v.
United States ("StandardOil") decision. See generally 221 U.S. 1 (1911). Shortly after
the decision was issued, Senator Newlands of Nevada proposed remedial legislation,
fearful that courts would be acting as regulators under the Standard Oil standard. See
Averitt, supra note 13, at 231 (narrating Newland's objections to Standard Oil).
President Wilson was supportive of legislation, hoping to aid courts in determining what
constituted an unreasonable practice. See 51 CONG. REC. 1978-79 (1914); Kruse, supra
note 134, at 211. Legislation was also supported within the business communities who
wanted greater clarity and to know with greater certainty what would be considered an
142

unreasonable restraint on trade. See ROBERT E. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT
REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 179-80 (1972). See generally HENDERSON, supra note 16.

Under the Standard Oil standard, courts would conduct a case-by-case inquiry.
Standard Oil Co., 221 U.S. at 60. StandardOil has also been described as the first case
to recognize the true limitations of the Sherman Act and to address its legal deficiencies.
"The context clearly showed that a broader meaning was intended, and it was fair
inference that the law was aimed at agreements, combinations, or conspiracies which
had the effect of eliminating or limiting competition between the participants," not that it
was aimed at every such contract. See HENDERSON, supranote 16, at 5-6.

2013]1

FTC SECTION 5 MERGER DOCTRINE

983

In selecting the terms "unfair methods of competition,"
Congress sought to give the FTC broad power in defining the scope
of unfair competition.'" Congress also hoped that section 5 would
serve as a gap-filler for other conduct missed by the express terms
in the Clayton Act, targeting acquisitions that may have the effect
"substantially [to] lessen competition or tend to create a
monopoly."14 5 By framing the FTC's power broadly, Congress
granted the FTC great discretion, hoping to move antitrust policy
into the hands of skilled economists, rather than judges and
politicians with varying and competing notions of how antitrust
law could and should be used.14 6

14
The Act went through various versions. The initial FTC Act did not contain a
substantive provision-it merely provided for the Commission's procedural evaluation.
The first draft of what is now section 5, used the term "unfair competition," which was
meant to encompass both those acts enumerated in the Clayton Act, while also leaving
room for courts and the Commission to give additional substance to the language. See
HENDERSON, supra note 16, at 34-35; see also S. REP. No. 63-597, at 13 (1914) (noting
that in deciding whether to enumerate illegal conduct or leave the language general,
Congress chose the latter in recognition that there were "too many unfair practices to
define, and after writing 20 of them into the law it would be quite possible to invent
others"). The context in which the statute was passed suggests that Congress was
primarily concerned with conduct tending toward monopoly. See Kruse, supra note 134,
at 214-16 (arguing that section 5 was intended to address conduct tending toward
monopolization); see also FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421, 428-29 (1920) (rejecting the FTC's
claim because it failed to demonstrate that the conduct tends toward monopoly).
145 HENDERSON, supra note 16, at 44-48 (arguing that the FTC was the stronger of
the two Acts and that "in so far as the proponents of supplemental anti-trust legislation
had hoped to clarify the law of restraints and monopolies by substituting specific rules of
conduct for general principles, they had largely failed"). Similarly, Congress intended
section 5 to supplement section 2 of the Sherman Act. Id. at 36-38 (describing
advantages of section 5 over section 2 of the Sherman Act).
'4
Cf Discount Pricing Consumer Protection Act, S. 2261, 110th Cong. (2007)
(seeking to overturn the court's decision in Leggin and thereby restoring the per se rule of
liability in resale price maintenance cases).
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Sperry & Hutchinson and Others Shine a Light
Early case law supported Congress's broad vision of section
5.147 Although the vague language of section 5 has been an area of
heated contestation, proponents of an expanded section 5 often
point to these early cases-most predominantly, FTC v. Sperry &
Hutchinson Co. 1 48 In Sperry & Hutchinson, the Supreme Court
looked to the text and legislative history of section 5, holding that
section 5 empowered the Commission to "define and proscribe an
unfair competitive practice, even though the practice [did] not
infringe either the letter or the spirit of the antitrust laws."14 9
Moreover, the Court indicated that section 5 permitted the
Commission to "proscribe practices as unfair or deceptive in their
effect upon consumers regardless of their nature or quality as
competitive practices or their effect on competition."s 0 During the
b.

1
See infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text (describing Sperry & Hutchinson);
FTC v. Ind. Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447 (1986) (noting § 5 is more expansive in scope
than § 1 of the Sherman Act); FTC v. R. F. Keppel & Bro., Inc., 291 U.S. 304, 313-14
(1934) (finding in favor of the FTC where evidence of harm to the consumer and public
policy interests are shown). "Commission has broad power to apply s 5 to reach
transactions which violate the standards of the Clayton Act, although technically not
subject to the Act's prohibitions," United States v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S.
271, 279 n.7 (1975), and "[wihile alternative constructions may be gleaned from
congressional legislative history, it seems that, on balance, the Commission has
authority under section 5 to proceed against equivalent types of practices not within the
jurisdictional bounds of the coverage specified in the Clayton Act." S. Chesterfield
Oppenheim, Guides to Harmonizing Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act
with the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 59 MICH. L. REV. 821, 835 (1961); see FTC v.
Motion Picture Adver. Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1953) (holding that the FTC Act
"was designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act").
'4 405 U.S. 233 (1972). A precursor to Sperry & Hutchinson can be found in FTC v.
Brown Shoe Co., in which the Supreme Court held that the FTC could "arrest trade
restraints in their incipiency without proof that they amount to an outright violation of s
3 of the Clayton Act," and that "'[it is clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was
designed to supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act to stop in their
incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would violate those Acts.' " 384 U.S.
316, 322 (1966) (quoting Motion PictureAdver. Serv., 344 U.S. at 394-95).
14 Sperry & Hutchinson, 405 U.S. at 239-41, 243-44 (explicating on text and
Congressional intent of section 5 as justifying broad interpretation).
1)0 Id. at 239. The Court cited and approved three factors used by the FTC:
(1) whether the practice, without necessarily having been previously considered
unlawful, offends public policy as it has been established by statutes, the common law, or
otherwise-whether, in other words, it is within at least the penumbra of some common
law, statutory, or other established concept of unfairness; (2) whether it is immoral,
unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; (3) whether it causes substantial injury to
consumers, competitors, or other businessmen. Id. at 244 n.5 (citation omitted). Despite
this finding, the Court remanded the case to the Court of Appeals with instructions to
remand it back to the Commission upon finding that the Commission's initial opinion
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1970s, the scope of section 5 continued to expand. Courts
acknowledged section 5 as a "potentially ... dynamic analytical
tool capable of progressive, evolving application which can keep
pace with a rapidly changing economy"' and used section 5 where
the statutory language of the Clayton Act was limiting.152
The legislative history of section 5 and the Court's early
interpretation of section 5 contemplate a role for the FTC outside
the purview of the Clayton and Sherman Acts. 15 3 While Sperry &
Hutchinson created an avenue for an expansive section 5 power,
the FTC's subsequent attempts to push the boundaries of
traditional antitrust legal doctrine have been rebuffed by the
courts. 154
2.

Clayton Act, Section 7
The Clayton Act was ratified in conjunction with the FTC Act.
Unlike the FTC Act, the Clayton Act provides a more specific
enumeration of what Congress hoped to target with its new
"failed to 'articulate any rational connection between the facts found and the choice
made.'" Id. at 249-50 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States., 371 U.S.
156, 168 (1962)). The Court also stated that despite the broad scope of section 5, the
Commission's "opinion is barren of any attempt to rest the order on its assessment of
particular competitive practices or considerations of consumer interests independent of
possible or actual effects on competition. Nor were any standards for doing so referred to
or developed." Id. at 248.
151Pfizer, Inc., 81 F.T.C. 23, 1972 WL 127465, at *28 (July 11, 1972).
152For example, the FTC used section 5 to challenge a merger where entities
were not corporations and therefore, at the time, not subject to section 7 of the
Clayton Act. Beatrice Foods Co., 67 F.T.C. 473, 1965 WL 92798, at *7, *121 (Apr. 26,
1965). The FTC also used section 5 to challenge a merger that did not involve
"interstate commerce," which at the time prevented a section 7 claim. Foremost
Dairies, Inc., 60 F.T.C. 944, 1962 WL 75760, at *64, *112-13 (Apr. 30, 1962). See
generally CORPORATE COUNSEL'S GUIDE TO RELATIONS WITH COMPETITORS (2010)
(arguing section 5 use as an interstitial provision).
153 For a critique of this view, see generally James A. Rahl, Does Section 5 of the
FederalTrade CommissionAct Extend the Clayton Act, 5 ANTITRUST BULL. 533, 539-41
(1960) ("I do not believe, however, that it was ever seriously considered that the FTC Act
could or should operate to supplement the very specific Clayton Act provisions, until the
unexpected dictum of the Supreme Court in FTC v. Motion PictureAdvertising Service
Co .... .).
154 See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text (examining ways in which
section 5 has been limited by the courts). A similar path of proposed expansion and
limitation by the courts is evidenced in the line of Sherman Act cases. See E.I. Du Pont
De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729 F.2d 128, 135-39 (2d Cir. 1984); Boise Cascade Corp. v.
FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 581-82 (9th Cir. 1980); Official Airlines Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630 F.2d
920, 923, 927-28 (2d Cir. 1980). For a discussion of these cases and the limits it imposed
on the FTC with respect to the Sherman Act, see, for example, Miller, supra note 16, at
1500-03.
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In its relevant part, section 7 bars

acquisitions of "whole or any part of the stock . .. or any part of

the assets of another person engaged also in commerce or in any
activity affecting commerce ... the effect of such acquisition may

be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly."5
The Clayton Act and the FTC Act were clearly envisioned as
part of a coordinated effort to address perceived problems in U.S.
competition law.'5 7 How exactly the two statutes work with one
another, however, is less clear. Should they be viewed as a single
program such that conduct covered by section 7 is distinct from
conduct covered by section 5?' Should section 5 be able to target
the same or even additional conduct provided for in section 7?169
In other words, the statutory text does not resolve the question of
whether the FTC can have an independent section 5 action against
merging parties without alleging a section 7 violation.6 0
When section 7 is construed broadly, these questions are moot
because the FTC is free to bring section 7 challenges regardless of
the status of section 5.161 When section 7 is construed more
narrowly, however, the question becomes more relevant as
proponents of expansion seek to use section 5 as statutory grounds
for expanding liability beyond section 7.162
" See Averitt, supra note 13, at 261 (noting that the Clayton Act was driven by a
school seeking to provide "clear standards of legal and illegal conduct"). Section 2 of the
Clayton Act, for example, makes illegal price discrimination and section 3 targets
unlawful tying of goods in commerce. The Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C §§ 13-14 (2012).
x" 15 U.S.C. §18 (2012).
17 Averitt, supranote 13, at 260.
x18See Rahl, supra note 153, at 539.
159 See Miller, supra note 16, at 1488-89 (pointing to three interpretations of section
5: (1) FTC may use section 5 for conduct that only also violates antitrust law; (2) FTC
may enjoin conduct that antitrust laws do not reach; or (3) FTC can enjoin conduct on
pure section 5 grounds).
160 Id.
161In In re Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, Commissioner Deborah Majoras
dissented, arguing that there is "scholarly consensus" that the Clayton and Sherman
Acts, as currently interpreted, are broad enough to reach "nearly all matters that
properly warrant competition policy enforcement." Dissenting Statement of Chairman
Majoras at 1, 3, Negotiated Data Solutions LLC, No. 0510094 (Jan. 23, 2008), available
at http//www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0510094/080122majoras.pdf.
162 See infra notes 163-83 and accompanying text (describing a historical instance in
which section 7 was viewed as a constraint on antitrust law and section 5 was appealed
to in an effort to expand current merger doctrine); Cartensen & Questal, supra note 13,
at 860-61 (arguing that in passing the Clayton Act, Congress "addressed only those types
of mergers that then posed a threat to the economy" and recognized a need to use both
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Conglomeratesas an Early Test Case

In the 1960s and 1970s, some hoped that antitrust law, either
through an expansive section 7 reading or independent section 5
16
liability, would target the growing conglomerates of America.e
During this time, a number of companies engaged in successive
mergers giving rise to the modern day conglomerate.e' While
these mergers did not facially violate the Clayton Act because they
lacked the traditional horizontal and vertical characteristics of
mergers with which merger law was initially concerned, some
viewed the bigness of conglomerates as foreboding the end of the
locally owned, small business and were thus a force with which to
be reckoned.16 As Peter C. Carstensen and Nina H. Questal
explain, "conglomerate mergers between large firms involve a
quantum leap in terms of corporate growth, and ... such
instantaneous augmentation of size and power is particularly
undesirable."'

specific and general provisions, like section 5, in antitrust enforcement). There is also
substantial literature on just how far section 5 should go if it should be broader than the
Clayton Act. As Oppenheim argues:
Most important of all, this attempted accommodation of the several
statutes in this antitrust pattern should not be viewed as an invitation to
invoke section 5 whenever the Commission believes that the conduct "runs
counter" to or is contrary to "the spirit" of any one of these statutes. Such
vague grasping for jurisdiction would be a misconceived and uncontrolled
administrative discretion of the Commission neither intended by Congress
nor supportable on judicial review.
Oppenheim, supra note 147, at 837-38.
1' See infra notes 164-83 and accompanying text (providing narrative of
conglomerate busting and shared monopolies).
1" See Cartensen & Questal, supra note 13, at 841.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 842. The sorts of mergers that Cartensen and Questal were concerned with
include the General Electric merger with Utah International. Section 7 was not
implicated because the merger did not appear to substantially lessen competition or tend
toward monopoly because General Electric and Utah International were in entirely
different lines of business. See id. at 843-44.
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While early attempts to go after conglomerates using the
Clayton Act were unsuccessful,16 7 the FTC was able to gain some
ground in the courts."' In FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co.,169 for
example, the FTC challenged what it coined a "product-extension
merger," in which the merging entities were in complementary
markets. 170 The merging parties were not direct competitors, but
through the merger, the companies were able to gain efficiencies
through shared facilities and joint-marketing.'71 Although the
Court noted "[a]ll mergers are within the reach of s 7, and all must
be tested by the same standard,"'7 2 it agreed with the Commission
that such an acquisition had the potential to "reduce the
competitive structure of the industry by raising entry barriers"
and by "eliminat[ing] the potential competition of the acquiring
firm."'
Unlike the cases brought by the DOJ, the FTC framed
See, e.g., United States v. Intl Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D. Conn.
1970) (rejecting the government's case for failing to demonstrate substantial lessening of
competition); United States v. Nw. Indus., Inc., 301 F. Supp. 1066, 1095-98 (N.D. Ill.
1969) (denying a preliminary injunction because economic concentration does not
warrant a section 7 violation). Joseph F. Brodley commented that "[diuring what has
become one of the great merger waves of American history, narrow judicial
constructions of the Clayton Act have allowed conglomerate mergers to proceed
virtually unchecked." Joseph F. Brodley, Limiting Conglomerate Mergers: The Need for
Legislation, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 867 (1979) (tracking events leading up to proposed
legislation amending antitrust law in the 1970s).
168 While the FTC had some earlier success, its efforts to expand under a theory of
shared monopoly, as opposed to a theory of product-extension merger were less
successful, even though the ultimate concern was similar-overly concentrated markets
saturated by a few large companies. See Kruse, supra note 134, at 200-01 (examining
the FTC's efforts to break up the "ready-to-eat cereal companies" and petroleum
industries). Aspirations to expand antitrust law were not limited only to mergers but also
extended to Sherman Act violations. See E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. FTC, 729
F.2d 128, 130 (2d Cir. 1984) (finding that the FTC did not meet the evidentiary burden
for a section 5 violation in an instance of non-collusive business practices with
anticompetitive effects); Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 637 F.2d 573, 573 (9th Cir. 1980)
(denying the FTC's claim of a section 5 violation for the adoption and maintenance of
delivered price scheme permitting price fixing); Official Airlines Guides, Inc. v. FTC, 630
F.2d 920, 927 (2d Cir. 1980) (denying the FTC's section 5 allegation that Petitioner
arbitrarily failed to publish connecting flight schedules of commuter air carriers and
noting that "enforcement of the FTC's order ... would give the FTC too much power to
substitute its own business judgment for that of the monopolist"). For a discussion of
these cases and the limits it imposed on the FTC with respect to the Sherman Act, see,
for example, Miller, supra note 16, at 1500-03.
169 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
161

17

Id.

at 577-78.

171 Id.
172
173

Id. at 577.
Id. at 578.
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the merger as one of closely related entities that had the potential
to change broader markets generally, rather than individual

product markets. 17 4
Similarly, in Ecko Products Co. v. FTC,"' the court upheld the
FTC's order of divestiture, finding that the acquisition of a small
meat-handling equipment company with a large market share in a
line of products by a diversified manufacturing company, had a
tendency to substantially lessen competition in violation of section
7176 Appealing to United States v. Continental Can Co.,' 77 the
court found that section 7 could be violated where the merging
entities might become competitors in the future. 78
Even though the FTC never challenged a merger on section 5
grounds alone, its successes compared to the DOJ's failures,
suggest either greater deference to the FTC or an understood role
for section 5.179 During this time, the FTC viewed its power as
supplementary to the Clayton Act, but chose not to invoke section
5 as an independent claim of liability in either Proctor or Ecko.so
For some, however, these cases did not adequately consider the
potential social and economic harms of large conglomerates, and

" Id. at 586-94 (stating that the Court takes the Commission's word that this is
not a pure conglomerate merger, without explanation, and that the Court should
consider whether new standards should be adopted in addressing new forms of mergers,
and that in this case, the analysis focused on probable changes in market structure as a
proxy for market power).
175 347 F.2d 745 (7th Cir.
1965).
176 Id. at 753.
117 378 U.S. 441 (1964).
178 See Ecko Prods. Co., 347 F.2d at 752; see also Cont'l Can. Co., 378 U.S.
at 458;
United States v. Phila. Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 370 (1963) (holding that internal
expansion is socially preferable to growth by acquisition).
179 Courts' acceptance of the FTC's arguments stand in stark contrast to the courts'
general sentiment at the time, which involved reading section 7 narrowly. See, e.g., FTC
v. Am. Bldg. Maint. Indus., 422 U.S. 271, 275-76 (1975) (holding that it is not enough
for the acquisition to merely affect commerce, it must actually be "in commerce" and,
"[u]nder the explicit reach of s 7. .. not only must the acquiring corporation be 'engaged
in commerce,' but the corporation or corporations whose stock or assets are acquired
must be 'engaged also in commerce' ").
18o See Grand Union Co. v. FTC, 300 F.2d 92, 102-04 (2d Cir. 1962); James A Rahl,
supra note 153, at 533 ("In the recent Grand Union case . .. the Federal Trade
Commission asserted not only a power, but a duty to 'supplement and bolster' Section 2
of the amended Clayton Act. . . .").
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instead suggested that the courts and the FTC consider using
section 5 as an independent justification for dismantling
conglomerates.s1 8
While "[tihere is no principled reason why Section 5 should be
confined to [the letter] of the Clayton Act," courts have typically
maintained that the scope of section 5 is informed and constrained
by the scope of section 7.152 Therefore, when courts view section 7

in a limited fashion, section 5 is similarly constrained. It is
important to note that while the FTC historically challenged
mergers as violating section 7 only-in part, because it was so
expansive-it now challenges mergers under both section 7 and
section 5-perhaps in recognition of courts' recent reluctance to
find a section 7 violation.18 3
C. Reading Section 7 and Section 5 Narrowly
In the 1960s and 70s, the agencies limited their merger claims
to section 7. In recent years, however, the agencies' section 7
analyses have moved away from the rigid market analysis still
employed by the courts. This divergence prompted the FTC to
challenge mergers on section 7 and section 5 grounds and has
caused significant tension between the courts and the agencies.
FTC v. Arch Coal, Inc.184 and United States v. Oracle Corp.18 5
evidence this divergence. In both cases the court rejected the FTC
and the DOJ's requests for a preliminary injunction, believing the
agencies to be deficient in their market definitions and market
power analyses.

1I See Cartensen & Questal, supra note 13, at 846 (noting that where courts held
that merger violated antitrust laws, courts "focused on specific problems raised by the
particular combination in issue, rather than on broader social and economic effects"); see
also Bauer, supranote 47, at 369 (writing that the 1982 Merger Guidelines was too much
of a concession on the part of agencies in reacting to negative response to conglomerate
merger enforcement).
182 See Averitt, supra note 13, at 241.
- See, e.g., Cengage Learning Holding I, L.P., Proposed Final Judgment and
Competitive Impact Statement, 73 Fed. Reg. 34,948-01, 34,950 (Dep't of Justice June 19,
2008) (portraying the challenged acquisition as one that would "substantially lessen
competition in interstate trade and commerce in violation of Section 7 of the Clayton
Act"); Proctor & Gamble Co., 140 F.T.C. 944, 951 (2005) (charging that the acquisition
"constitutes a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act" and "if consummated, would
constitute a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act").

1" 329 F. Supp. 2d

109 (D.D.C. 2004).

15 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
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In Arch Coal, the FTC challenged the merger between Arch
Coal and New Vulcan, both owners of coal mines in the Southern
Powder River Basin.1 6 The FTC argued that the merger would
allow the parties to engage in tacit coordination that would limit
output and cause prices to rise.18' But rather than relying on a
direct impact on output, the FTC argued that the merger would
result in a lower coal output than would have existed absent the
merger. 188 The court, characterizing the FTC's theory as novel,
noted that the FTC's burden was therefore raised.189 Conducting a
full-fledged market analysis, the court concluded that the FTC did
not meet its burden of "showing a 'reasonable probability' that the
challenged transactions may substantially lessen competition"
raising "'serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful' questions
going to the merits that further investigation and deliberation by
the FTC ... are warranted."9 o The court therefore rejected the
FTC's request for a preliminary injunction.
In Oracle, the court rejected the DOJ's claim that the
acquisition of PeopleSoft, Inc. by Oracle Corporation would violate
section 7 by substantially lessening competition.191 Again, the
court conducted a full market analysis, examining the likely
anticompetitive effects of the merger with close scrutiny.19 2 In its
assessment of the DOJ's unilateral effects claim,193 the court
considered the economic viability of the theory.'94 The court also
heard testimony from customers, 9 5 experts in the field,196 and
others, before determining that the Government had not met its
burden of demonstrating a substantial lessening of competition by
a preponderance of the evidence.' 8

186

Arch Coal, 329 F. Supp. 2d at 114.

' Id. at 131.
188 Id. at 132.
189

Id.

190

Id. at 157.

191 United

States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1175-76 (N.D. Cal.

2004).
192Id. at 1109.

1 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 17, at 20 (defining unilateral
effects as those resulting from the "elimination of competition between two firms").
194 See Oracle, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 1113-18.
19

See id. at 1125-33.

196 See id. at 1133-34, 1145-48.
1 See id. at 1134-45, 1148-54.
198 Id. at 1175-76.
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Taken together, Arch Coal and Oracle were viewed as a
significant defeat for the antitrust agencies, evidencing the courts'
willingness to scrutinize agencies' findings and question the
market analysis employed in a non-deferential manner typically
associated with agency review.'99 As Deborah Feinstein notes, "[a]
commonly suggested explanation for the significant decline in
litigation activity in 2005 is that the agencies lost their nerve after
being handed high-profile defeats the previous year in Oracle and

Arch Coal."200
However, as Part II of this Article argues, rather than stifling
merger enforcement, Arch Coal and Oracle might have simply
redirected merger enforcement from the purview of litigation to
agency enforcement through the use of consent decrees and, in the
case of the FTC, an administrative adjudication. Recognizing that
the courts would be reluctant to endorse new theories of merger
liability, the agencies have instead sought alternative means to
push the law forward through the use of its Merger Guidelines
19 Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844
(1984) ("We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an
executive department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to
administer, and the principle of deference to administrative interpretations."). For a
general discussion of the Chevron doctrine and agency deference, see generally Note,
Chevron and the Substantive Canons: A CategoricalDistinction, 124 HARv. L. REV.
594 (2010); Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO.
L.J. 833 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (2006).
200 Deborah L. Feinstein, Recent Trends in U.S. Merger Enforcement: Down But Not
Out, ANTITRUST, Summer 2007, at 74, 76. In response to the courts' pushback on the
agencies' attempts to expand liability, some have suggested that while section 5 can be
viewed as expansive, it is particularly important that in its expansion, the FTC is
principled. Case law further supports the proposition that the FTC must evidence
tangible anticompetitive effects as understood by the courts, like evidence of market
power in a well-defined market. See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Federal Trade
Commission and the Sherman Act, 62 FLA. L. REV. 871, 875-76 (2010) (arguing for a
more expansive section 5 couched in anticompetitive justifications); Kovacic &
Winerman, supra note 118, at 944-45 (noting that "unfair methods of
competition ... should be a competition-based concept, in the modern sense of fostering
improvements in economic performance rather than equating the health of the
competitive process with the well-being of individual competitors"); Amanda Reeves,
Conduct-Specific Tests? How the Federal Trade Commission Can Reframe the Section 5
Debate, CPI ANTITRUST J., Feb. 2010, at 3 (arguing that FTC section 5 limiting principle
should be centered on evidence of anticompetitive effects); cf Robert H. Lande, FTC v.
Intel- Applying the "Consumer Choice" Framework to "Pure" Section 5 Allegations, CPI
ANTITRUST J., Feb. 2010, at 5-6 (arguing section 5 expansion should be shaped by
consumer choice framework); Michael A. Salinger, A Symposium on Antitrust &
Behavioral Economics: Behavioral Economics, Consumer Protection, and Antitrust, 6
COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L 65, 81-82 (2010) (discussing the implications of behavioral
economics for antitrust).
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and consent decrees. It is in this sphere of enforcement that the
FTC can use its administrative proceeding and section 5 powers to
extend merger law beyond current court doctrine.
IV. PAVING A CLEARER PATH FOR SECTION 5 JURISPRUDENCE
More so than ever, corporations are expanding via mergers
and acquisitions, opting for stair-like growth rather than the more
traditional slow and steady growth of a unified, singular entity.2 01
The HSR Act sought to address the administrative burdens and
concerns associated with the growth in transactions and in so
doing, created a new regime of merger enforcement.2 02 This new
regime primarily operates through the use of consent decrees
agreed to by the enforcing agency and the merging parties,20 3 and
in the case of the FTC, through an administrative proceeding
under the supervision of an ALJ.2 04 As this Article argues, current
merger enforcement processes give agencies greater discretion and
space to inform and direct antitrust law20 5 and, more specifically,
the interpretation of Clayton Act section 7 through consent
decreeS20 6 and its Merger Guidelines. 07
Unlike Sherman Act violations, Clayton Act section 7
violations are more often settled covertly within the antitrust
agencies as opposed to adjudicated and resolved before a district
court.20 8 Subsequently, changes in the agencies' philosophy or
approach to merger enforcement are less apparent than changes to
201 See, e.g., Mergers and Corporate Consolidation:HearingBefore the S. Comm.
on
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1998) (statement of Joel I. Klein, Assistant Att'y Gen.,
Antitrust Div., Dep't of Justice), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/publi/testimony/
1795.pdf (describing existence of merger wave during the 20th century); Susan Gribbin,
Washington Group International vs. Raytheon Company (Apr. 25, 2001),
http://ebookbrowse.com/susan-gribbin-washington-group-international-doc-d248389
52 (noting nearly every industry engages in mergers and acquisitions as normal form of
growth); Jon Swartz, Number and Value of Tech MergersIs on the Upswing, USA TODAY
(May 18, 2010), http-//www.usatoday.com/money/industries/technology/2010-05-18techacquisitions18 CVN.htm.
202 Bhagwat, supra note 60, at 1292.
203 See supra notes 71-82 and accompanying text (describing growth
of consent
decrees in merger enforcement).
204 See supra notes 71-92 and accompanying text (explicating FTC's administrative
process).
205 See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text (describing concerns
associated
with current structure of merger enforcement).
206 See supra Part IIIA.2.
207 See supra Part IIIA.3.
208 See supra Part II.A.2-3.
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conduct cases, because disputes are less likely to find themselves
before a district court judge.209 It is difficult to pinpoint exactly
how merger enforcement has changed-as has been discussed,
changes to merger enforcement guidelines provide one resource
evidencing change. But there are structural characteristics within
the FTC in particular which suggest that if merger enforcement
has not yet already changed, it is capable of changing without
detection both because the FTC has the added the statutory hook
of section 5 and because it has an administrative proceeding to
which courts defer, now more than ever. 210 As this Article argues,
while the FTC has greater flexibility in interpreting section 7
because it has the option to bring a case before an ALJ 2 1 1 the real
strength in pushing merger enforcement law lies within the
statutory hook of section 5, which allows the FTC to push for
consent decrees consistent with its view of how section 5 should be
used2 12 and gives ALJs license to go beyond understood Merger
Guidelines or traditional section 7 interpretation.2 13 As a result,
parties facing merger review may increasingly find themselves at
a disadvantage where the FTC is involved.214
This raises a number of concerns including a general lack of
transparency and thus predictability in the merger enforcement
system and the appearance of differing standards applicable to
different industries.2 15 To remedy the perceived shortfalls of
209As discussed, many cases have challenged attempts by the agencies to expand
conduct liability particularly with respect to section 5. Consequently, much has been
authored to understand the relationship between the Sherman Act and the FTC Actmuch less has been authored to understand the relationship between the Clayton Act
and the FTC Act.
210 See supra notes 98-119 and accompanying text (explaining structural
characteristics of the FTC that permit changes to merger enforcement law).
211 See supra notes 163-78 and accompanying text.
212 See supra note 118 (describing views of Commissioners).
213 See supra Part III.B (providing reasoning for how administrative process and
section 5 give the FTC greater space to inform merger enforcement law); see also
Hoffman & Royall, supra note 98, at 331 ("[I1n recent Commission actions, the FTC's
adjudicative process has been employed to litigate consummated mergers; to test claims
of efficiency justifications for restraints agreed to among joint venturers; to address a
variety of provocative issues surrounding pharmaceuticals; and to challenge the alleged
subversion of standards-setting activities to achieve anticompetitive ends. Each of these
cases would seem to lie at the heart of the role originally envisioned, and frequently
reaffirmed, for administrative litigation before the FTC.").
214See supra Part III.C (explaining initial concerns of division between agency
standards).
215 See supra notes 120-33 and accompanying text (describing some initial concerns
with structural characteristics of merger enforcement system).
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current merger enforcement, this Article argues that the FTC
should establish its own section 5 Merger Guidelines ("FTC
Guidelines") to provide merging entities and courts with guidance
as to how section 5 will play out in the merger context and,
moreover, provide courts with reason to affirm specific expansions
of the FTC power rather than equating and limiting section 5
doctrine to section 7 doctrine. Part IV.A will consider the
mechanics of this scheme while providing an initial suggestion as
to its substantive content. Part IV.B will examine why the FTC
Guidelines are a good alternative compared to other options.
Finally, Part 1V.C will briefly describe the feasibility of such a
scheme.
A.

The FTC Guidelines

To avoid the appearance of divergent standards applicable to
parties based on historical experience and expertise,21 6 the FTC
should adopt, similarly to the joint-agency Merger Guidelines, a
set of the FTC Guidelines. The FTC Guidelines should describe
the types of mergers section 5 will target as well as the factors the
FTC will consider in evaluating a proposed transaction similarly
Although there will
to the existing Merger Guidelines.
understandably be some overlap with traditional section 7
mergers, the FTC Guidelines should fundamentally be concerned
with mergers that are not currently targeted by section 7 and the
joint-agency Merger Guidelines. To avoid unequal treatment
between industries, the FTC Guidelines will be applicable to all
industries. Mechanically, they will operate similarly to the
current Merger Guidelines. Where a merger falls within the
purview of the FTC Guidelines rather than the Merger Guidelines,
the DOJ may simply hand the case over to the FTC.2 17 By
distinguishing a set of section 5 mergers and section 7 mergers,
the FTC will be able to go after mergers in all industries that meet
its standards and thus equalize the playing field,2 18 give courts
reason to support an independent section 5 jurisprudence by

216 See supra notes 60-70 and accompanying text (explaining the merger clearance
process).
217 A similar scheme currently operates within conduct cases. Where the FTC is
investigating a case that is more appropriately a criminal case, it will hand the case over
to the DOJ for further investigation and prosecution.
218See Part IVA (elaborating on potential structure of new section 5 reform).
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legitimizing and clarifying the process, 21 and better fulfill its
congressional mandate. 22 0 Similarly to the current joint-agency
Merger Guidelines, the FTC Guidelines will give courts reason to
extend section 5 in a direction consistent with the agency's view,
potentially establishing a precedent upon which the FTC
Guidelines can be further informed.2 2 1
Substantively, the FTC could target its new guidelines to a
variety of mergers and acquisitions.22 2 One potential area of
concern that the FTC Guidelines could address is with the
modem-day conglomerate. 22 3
Appealing to the conglomerate
219 See supra note 118 (describing courts' reluctance
to permit expansion of antitrust
law where the agencies have provided weak guidelines and concrete means of review);
see also Rubenstein, supra note 94, at 2231-32 ("Chevron recognized the potential
dangers of giving administrators carte blanche discretion in policymaking. By deferring
only to 'reasonable' interpretations, Chevron obliges agencies to operate within the
permissible bounds of statutory text. In this way, courts continue to promote Congress's
primacy in lawmaking as well as the core judicial function of promoting administrative
fidelity to Congress's loosely expressed commands.").
220 See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (providing a narrative of section
5 congressional history); see also Kolasky, Jr. & Lowe, supra note 61, at 896 ("Congress
intended that the Commission would be: first, a politically independent enforcer that
would be more active, creative, and far-reaching than the DOJ had been; second, a
sophisticated antitrust tribunal that would develop recognized expertise and provide
business clear guidance as to the scope and meaning of the antitrust laws; and third, a
source of research and guidance for the business community."); Miller, supra note 16, at
1496 ('The legislative history of the FTC Act, because vast, is a bit slippery.
Nevertheless, it does provide ample evidence that the purpose of the Act was to create an
administrative agency with antitrust expertise, an enforcement mandate more expansive
than that of the antitrust laws, and the structure and flexibility to identify, analyze, and
challenge new forms of unfair methods of competition as they developed." (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
221 See generally Greene, supra note 47, at 810-15 (explaining institutionalization of
Guidelines as driving force for court deference of agency interpretation of antitrust law).
222 See, e.g., Parker, supra note 57 (tracking shifts in mergers relating to the health
industry and need for reform); Ronald W. Davis, Innovation Markets and Merger
Enforcement: Current Practice in Perspective, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 677, 677-84 (20032004) (suggesting new merger approaches in "innovation markets"); cf Feinstein, supra
note 200, at 74-76, 79 (noting that agency doctrine has shifted from 1984 Vertical
Merger Guidelines, but unclear whether process of drafting is worthwhile in light of the
low frequency of actual litigation); David T. Scheffman & Richard S. Higgins, Vertical
Mergers: Theory and Policy, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 967, 967-69, 971, 977 (2004)
(arguing that there is no need for new Vertical Merger Guidelines in light of the FTC's
continued persistence to enforce vertical mergers).
223 See Gotts, supra note 132, at 9-12 (noting conglomerate theories are being
investigated more extensively under "changed incentive" theory of harm and that
this view is supported by recent attacks on consummated mergers). For a review of
competitive concerns raised with conglomerates, see Harlan M. Blake, Conglomerate
Mergers and the Antitrust Laws, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 555, 571-79 (1973); Simon N.
Whitney, Mergers, Conglomerates, and Oligopolies:A Widening of Antitrust Targets,

2013]

FTC SECTION 5 MERGER DOCTRINE

997

language of the 1970s, the FTC could use section 5 to get at
mergers, which section 7 has been unable to reach, focusing more
on the anticompetitive effects associated with "bigness."224 As
Judge Wyzanski stated in 1953:
Concentrations of power, no matter how beneficently they
appear to have acted, not what advantages they seem to
possess, are inherently dangerous. Their good behavior in the
past may not be continued; and if their strength were hereafter
grasped by presumptuous hands, there would be no automatic
check and balance from equal forces in the industrial market.
And in the absence of this protective mechanism, the demand
for public regulation, public ownership, or other drastic
measures would become irresistible in time of crisis. Dispersal
of private economic power is thus one of the ways to preserve
the system of private enterprise.22 5
There are a number of reasons why we might be more
concerned with bigness today than we were in the 1970s. First,
"bigness" today operates on an entirely different level than it did
in the 1970s. The merger that most concerned critics was the
General Electric and Utah International merger priced at $2.17
billion in 1976.226 That is the equivalent of $8.88 billion in 2014.227
21 RUTGERS L. REV. 187, 231-37 (1967). For an economic reasoning and analysis
evidencing these concerns, see Jeffrey Church, ConglomerateMergers, in 2 ISSUES IN
COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 1503, 1506-07, 1519-45 (ABA Section of Antitrust
Law 2008).
224 See generally ROBERT PITOFSKY ET AL., TRADE REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 967-71 (6th ed. 2010) (examining the reasoning for the adoption of
potentially stricter merger laws). For a review of potential standards or tests for
regulating conglomerates, see, for example, Church, supra note 223, at 1548 (arguing
for a structured rule of reason assessing "(1) a market power screen, (2) a theory of
the case and factual screen, and (3) an assessment of offsetting nonprice efficiencies
realized by the merger"). Blake, supra note 223, at 590-92 (reviewing three
legislative proposals to regulate conglomerates and supporting presumption of
anticompetitive effect based on size); Henry A. Einhorn, Antitrust and the
ConglomerateMovement: An Alternative from the Regulated Sector, 44 ST. JOHN'S L.
REV. 451, 457-59 (1970) (proposing the use of "net benefits" analysis to determine
whether conglomerate mergers warrant antitrust scrutiny); Irwin M. Stelzer,
Antitrust Policy and the Conglomerate, 44 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 196, 200-04 (1970)
(describing potential public policy factors that may be relevant in evaluating
conglomerates).
225 United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 347 (D. Mass.
1953).
226 See Special Report, Anatomy of the General Electric-Utah International
Merger, 4 EXECuTIVE INTELLIGENCE REV. 29, 29 (1977).
227 Calculated at CPI INFLATION CALCULATOR, http//data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicale.pl
(last visited Mar. 9, 2014).
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In 2000 alone, GE sought to purchase Honeywell for a whopping
$45 billion.228 In 2004, it acquired Amersham PLC for $9.5 billion
and Vivendi Universal Entertainment for $14 billion, in what were
viewed as small, uncontested acquisitions.2 2 9
Additionally, more industries now rely on large economies of
scale to successfully compete in a global economy than was the
case in the 1970s. Being big is a prerequisite to success in many
industries, creating larger barriers to entry than had previously
existed.2"
To enter some of the more competitive and global
markets, parties must be willing to enter a variety of markets
relevant to production and to enter with significant capital. The
Internet has also changed the geographic market in which
corporations operate. Historically limited to a local consumer
base, companies now compete with foreign companies for global
customers that purchase items online rather than in stores. In
2008, the Nielsen Survey found that 85% of the world's population
and 92% of the population in North America had made purchases
online.2 3 ' Revenues generated from e-commerce sales have also
been on the rise.132
Furthermore, as noted above, corporations now rely largely on
mergers for growth, meaning that a company may engage in a
number of transactions amounting to massive increases in capital,

228 See Luisa Beltran & Martha Slud, GE Sets Honeywell Deal, CNNMONEY
(Oct. 23, 2000), http://money.cnn.com/2000/10/23/deals/honeywell-gelindex.htm.
229 See, e.g., GE Completes Amersham Acquisition, IN-PHARMA
TECHNOLOGIST.COM
(Apr. 13, 2004), http//www.in-pharmatechnologist.com/Regulatory-Safety/GE-completesAmersham-acquisition; Richard Verrier & Meg James, GE, Vivendi Finalize NBC
Universal Deal, LA. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2003), http/articles.latimes.com/2003/oct/09/
business/fi-nbc9.
230 The importance of size is evident, for example, in Staples, the FTC noted the
difficulty of entering the market of specialty stores and described prior failed attempts.
FTC v. Staples, 970 F. Supp. 1066, 1087 (D.D.C. 1997).
231 NIELSEN, TRENDS IN ONLINE SHOPPING: A GLOBAL NIELSEN CONSUMER REPORT
1 (2008), available at http//at.nielsen.com/sitedocuments/GlobalOnlineShoppingReport
Feb08.pdf.
22 In 2008, e-commerce sales accounted for approximately 3.4% of total retail sales.
QuarterlyRetail E-Commerce Sales: 3rd Quarter2008, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 19,
2008, 10:00 AM), http//www.census.gov/mrts/www/data/html/08Q3.html. By the end of
2013, that number had increased to 7%. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU: ESTIMATED QUARTERLY
U.S. RETAIL SALES (NOT ADJUSTED): TOTAL AND E-COMMERCE, available at
https/www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/datalexcel/tsnotadjustedsales.xls (last revised
Feb. 18, 2014). Sales in the top five hundred online retailers grew 8.7% in 2009. See
Jochen Krisch, Internet Retailer: Top 500 in the USA (2009), OPTAROS BLOG (Jun. 22,
2010), httpJ/www.optaros.com/blogs/internet-retailer-top-500-in-the-usa-2009.
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even if individually each transaction is relatively small. Firms,
therefore, can grow more quickly even absent the larger mergers
that might raise agency attention.
Finally, greater credence has been given to the view that a
company with cross-market power might be more susceptible to
illegal tying or predation.23 3 The traditional focus on market
power and market definition may therefore miss potential
anticompetitive effects that occur cross market. As the new 2010
Merger Guidelines note, "[t]he Agencies' analysis need not start
with market definition.... Evidence of competitive effects can
inform market definition, just as market definition can be
informative regarding competitive effects."234
The greater scale and level at which "bigness" operates, and
the growing recognition that market power may not adequately
capture the degree to which economies of scale permit
anticompetitive conduct, offers a space outside traditional section
7 analysis for section 5 to operate.
Take, for example,
Amazon.com: It is a $170.87 billion operation,23 5 and by far the
largest U.S. online retailer, followed by Staples with less than half
of Amazon's sales.23 6 Over the last five years, Amazon has
engaged in a number of acquisitions, purchasing both those
companies within its traditional "book market" as well as those
outside of its traditional market in hopes of expanding and
breaking into new markets. In 2009, for example, Amazon.com
consummated a deal with Zappos.com, an online shoe retailer, for
$1.2 billion.237 In 2010, Amazon acquired Woot.com, a small online
Cf United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1115 (10th Cir. 2003) (TostChicago economists have theorized that price predation is not only plausible, but
profitable, especially in a multi-market context where predation can occur in one market
and recoupment can occur rapidly in other markets.").
234 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supranote 17, at 7.
235 Amazon.com Inc. (AMZN), YAHOO FINANCE, httpJ//finance.yahoo.com/q?s=AMZN
(last accessed Mar. 9, 2014).
236 In 2009, Amazon accounted for 19.4% of online sales generated by the top 500
online retailers in North America. See Mark Brohan, The Top 500 Guide 2010, INTERNET
RETAILER (May 27, 2010, 1:20 PM), http://www.intemetretailer.com/2010/05/27/top-500guide.
231 See Thomas Kaplan, Deal Gives Amazon a Diaper Strategy, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9,
2010, at B10; Allison Abell Schwartz, Amazon.com To Acquire Zappos.com in Biggest
Purchase (Update3), BLOOMBERG (July 22, 2009, 19:21 EDT), http://www.bloom
berg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aFwAulHL7K8k. In 2009, Amazon also
acquired SnapTell, a small image recognition startup, and Lexcycle, the producer of a
popular e-book application. See Leena Rao, Image Recognition Startup SnapTell
Acquired by Amazon Subsidiary A9.com, TECHCRUNCH (June 16, 2009),
233
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discount retailer, 3 8 and, for $545 million, acquired Quidsi, the
owner of Diapers.com. 2 39 Although Amazon has largely been a
product of organic growth, acquisitions of this sort allow Amazon
to break into markets in which it had otherwise struggled to make
headway.24 0 This was the case in its acquisition of Diapers.com
and seems to be a continuing trend. In 2011, Amazon announced
its purchase of LoveFilm, an international competitor of Netflix, 2 4 1
and Pushbutton, 2 42 allowing Amazon to make accessible to its
members over 5,000 free movies and television shows.243 From
this view, Amazon might provide a good target for section 5.
Unlike traditional markets,2 44 Amazon operates across various
product markets. Consumers can purchase a large variety of
books, Halloween costumes, non-perishable foods, and highdefinition televisions from the same site: It is like a conglomerate,
but serves the entire public through the Internet. The geographic
scope is, therefore, more expansive than traditional conglomerates.
Although Amazon does not have significant market power in the
sale of online shoes or groceries, it has a degree of market power
for online retail sales generally and, unlike the Staples or the Wal-

http//techcrunch.com/2009/06/16/image-recognition-startup-snaptell-acquired-byamazon-subsidiary-a9com; Brad Stone, Amazon Acquires Stanza, an E-Book Application
for the iPhone, N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG (Apr. 27, 2009, 4:03 PM), http://bits.blogs.ny
times.com/2009/04/27/amazon-acquires-stanza-an-e-book-application-for-the-iphone.
2-8 See Josh Lowensohn, Amazon Acquiring Eccentric Retailer Woot.com, CNET
(June 30, 2010, 1:51 PM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-27076_3-20009333-248.html.
239 See, e.g.,
Jay Yarow, Amazon Announces $545 Million Acquisition of
Diapers.com, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 8, 2010, 9:11 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/
amazon-announces-500-million-acquisition-of-diaperscom-2010-11.
240 See Kaplan, supra note 237 (noting Amazon's use of acquisitions to get into shoe
and diaper business).
241 See, e.g., Ben Rooney, Digital Media: Amazon Buys Remainder of LoveFilm,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 21, 2011, at B6; Parmy Olson, Amazon Thwarts Netflix with
Lovefilm Buy, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2011, 7:17 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmy
olson/2011/01/21/amazon-thwarts-netflix-with-lovefilm-buy.
242 See Paul
Sawers, Amazon Acquires London-Based TV App Company
Pushbutton, TNW (July 28, 2011 1:23 PM), http://thenextweb.com/uk/2011/07/28/
amazon-acquires-london-based-tv-app-company-pushbutton.
243 See Greg Sandoval, Amazon Streams Free Movies to Prime Members, CNET
(Feb. 22, 2011, 6:13 AM), http://news.cnet.com/8301-31001-3-20034714-261.html.
2" See Parker,supra note 57 ("[Unlike the transactions of a decade ago which were
primarily motivated by financial considerations, today's transactions are increasingly
strategic in nature. Many firms perceive a need to be the market leader, and use
acquisitions as the path to leadership. Other acquisitions come about where firms seek to
acquire critical inputs in the market. Other acquisitions may be motivated by a desire to
relieve competitive pressures in the market.").
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Marts of the world, does not have a physical store. 2 45 Amazon,
therefore, has greater ability to adjust and leverage prices because
it is not tied to a particular "in-store" price, and it also may offset
losses in one market for gains in another. In the case of
Diapers.com, for example, Amazon had previously competed by
"selling its diapers at rock-bottom prices-something that analysts
said might now change."246
Because of Amazon's novel presence in the market, recognized
both as a market leader but, at the same time, an insignificant
player in any given product market with perhaps the exception of
e-readers and e-books, it provides a good test case for potential
areas of interest for the new FTC Guidelines. In particular,
Amazon illuminates issues that existing Merger Guidelines do not
capture and thus provides fertile ground for independent section 5
Guidelines. First, the FTC may want to consider market share
across various markets rather than limiting itself to a single
product market as the current Merger Guidelines suggest. 47
Although that percentage might be below ten percent for each
separate market, the FTC might use section 5 to better
understand and target cross-market power and effects and
understand how small market shares in the aggregate can, in
certain markets, present high risks for anticompetitive conduct.
Second, the FTC Guidelines may want to consider how prices
change post-merger or might be expected to change post-merger
even if market shares are low.2 48 This suggestion is consistent
with language in the newly revised 2010 Merger Guidelines, which
express concern with over-reliance on market definitions.24 9 In the
case of Amazon, the FTC would want to look to the changes in
See supra notes 235-36 and accompanying text (describing Amazon's sales
compared to other online retailers).
246 Kaplan, supra note 240.
247 Cf Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222-23
(1993) (holding that predatory pricing liability is premised on more than simply showing
pricing below costs); Cascade Health Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 905-06 (9th
Cir. 2008) (rejecting price measurements based on Plaintiffs costs in bundling cases);
United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1117-20 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting
alternative measures of price as appropriate for determining antitrust liability).
248 In FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., the FTC sought to target a consummated merger that
resulted in higher prices, but the court rejected that the two products were in the same
"market" and, therefore, could not cause the sort of anticompetitive effects antitrust law
targeted. See FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc., Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010
WL 3810015, at *1, *21-22 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010), affd, 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011).
249 For a description of how the 2010 merger guidelines changed the focus of merger
enforcement and its likely effects, see generally Hovenkamp, supra note 6.
245
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diaper prices after its merger with Quidsi. Even though Quidsi
might have a small share of the online diaper market, the agencies
might be concerned that Amazon would be able to leverage its
broad consumer base to raise Quidsi's prices while pushing other
competitors out of the market. In other words, consumers might
opt out of going to Huggies.com to purchase cheaper diapers when
they can do so at Amazon at a premium while also purchasing the
rest of their holiday presents and groceries. This result, however,
would not necessarily reward the more efficient producer.
Although this fact alone should not necessarily give rise to
antitrust liability,2 50 it should, at the very least, raise agency
concern.
Finally, Amazon's case suggests that the FTC should concern
itself with how conglomerates may stifle innovation. Because
online retailers operate over the Internet, mergers and
acquisitions are relatively inexpensive and easy transactions, and
the pressures imposed on Internet service providers often mean
that new, successful websites are quickly absorbed into larger
institutions. Once a website becomes "viral," it is immediately the
target of an acquisition, at a pace not present with the classical
mergers, which require massive asset and capital shifts and time
consuming consolidations. The dot-com industry, subsequently,
has grown through more frequent, smaller mergers than the
agencies have seen in the past."'
Section 5 might add value in industries that, although part of
large, influential markets, do not fall within the traditional mold
of a products market, but might, nonetheless, result in
250

Cf Brooke Grp. Ltd., 509 U.S. at 230-32 (noting that the competitive pricing

scheme, which included rebates to wholesalers, was not enough to give rise to liability
because there was no evidence that defendant had a reasonable chance to recoup its
losses).
251 Cf Mergers and Acquisitions - JoiningForces To Compete with Industry Giants,
Seeking Refuge with a

Larger Partner, FREE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ECOMMERCE,

http://ecommerce.hostip.info/pages/725/Mergers-Acquisitions.html (last visited Mar. 9,
2014) (describing examples of recent mergers and acquisitions of dot-com businesses).
Innovation markets are defined as those that might facilitate innovation but from a
traditional antitrust perspective would be anticompetitive. See Davis, supra note 222, at
677; see also Katz & Shelanski, supra note 6 ("Merger policy faces a perplexing problem
in industries marked by ongoing technological innovation: a problem related, in part, to
the uncertain fit between the market conditions that produce innovation and the market
conditions to which antitrust policy generally aspires, and, in part, to uncertainty about
how innovation might affect market structure and performance."). The new merger
guidelines also evidence a growing concern with stifling innovation and the importance of
variety of products. See Hovenkamp, supra note 6, at 3-4.
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anticompetitive effects.25 2 The Amazons of the world present one
area in which section 5 might find its home-in new industries
that rely on economies of scale across many markets, and in which
there is greater risk for anticompetitive effects despite small
market shares.
B.

ChoosingFTC Guidelines over Other Alternatives
There are various options that some may consider preferable
to the development of independent FTC Guidelines. Namely,
critics might suggest that agency power has gone too far and that
the FTC should be kept in check, avoiding any unwanted
expansion of section 5. At the same time, FTC Guidelines might
prove unwieldy absent any clear doctrinal guidance. As noted,
courts have typically deferred from establishing the limits or scope
of section 5 as applied to mergers. In FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc.,253 for
example, the FTC challenged a merger both on section 5 and
section 7 grounds.25 4 While the court noted that "[flor present
purposes, the parties agree that Section 5 of the FTC Act prohibits
the same conduct as Section 2 of the Sherman Act," the court
made no mention of section 5 in its discussion of the Clayton Act
violations. 5 5 Rather, the court starts, "[tihe FTC claims that
Lundbeck acquired the rights to NeoProfen in violation of Section
7 of the Clayton Act,"25 6 discarding the section 5 allegation
altogether. Absent a clear interpretation of section 5 by the
courts, the FTC Guidelines might prove to be too big a step in
merger enforcement development.
Alternatively, we could envision a regime that simply expands
the scope of section 7.
However, expanding section 7
jurisprudence ignores the ability of the FTC to use section 5 as a
way to expand doctrine even further. Arguably, the adoption of
the 2010 Merger Guidelines demonstrated an effort by the
agencies to change the focus of traditional section 7 analysis
focusing more on effects rather than market definition and power.
The Merger Guidelines have historically been a means for the
For a discussion of the difficulties associated with drafting guidelines to
inform antitrust enforcement against conglomerates, see Church, supra note 223, at
1545-46.
2"
Lundbeck, 2010 WL 3810015.
254 See id. at *1.
255 See id. at *21.
256 Id. at *1.
252
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agencies to communicate both to merging parties and to courts
shifts in doctrine and economic analysis.25 7 It has also signaled to
the courts that the process is not without standards, making the
courts more comfortable with agency deference.258 Unfortunately,
section 5 jurisprudence is still clouded in ambiguity without clear
guidance from either courts or agencies;2 59 absent guidance from
the agencies, courts will continue to treat section 5 consistent with
section 7 for fear of subjecting parties to unknown metrics and
boundaries.2 0 In so doing, courts have evaded the fact that most
merger enforcement happens behind closed doors, without the
protection of the courts. This fact makes it more important that
clear guidelines be established for section 5, specifically to give
parties greater predictability and perhaps leverage in the
negotiating process. Because many of the conglomerate mergers
discussed above would not be subject to HSR pre-merger review,2 61
directing section 5 specifically to mergers not conducive to the
general consent decree procedure would bring section 5 doctrine to
the forefront, requiring judicial resolution.
As to reining in the FTC, the sheer administrative burden
makes this option implausible. Courts hear and determine such a
small percentage of merger cases.262 Court action is limited to
cases that either the agencies or parties choose to bring. The FTC
may very well opt for an administrative proceeding rather than a
preliminary injunction where the deterrent effect is the same,
namely, preventing the consummation of the deal for fear of future
breakup. Moreover, parties have incentives to cut a deal with the
agencies, preserving good rapport with the agencies because
257 See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text (tracking courts' reliance of
Merger Guidelines); see also Greene, supra note 47, at 778-81 (describing Merger
Guidelines as having an express role of helping parties navigate agency negotiations and
an implicit role of giving commentary on law).
258 See Greene, supra note 47, at 801-02 (noting the passage of the 1982 Merger
Guidelines was a response to court losses and that previously rejected arguments were
subsequently adopted by courts).
259 See supra notes 147-54 and accompanying text (describing early section 5 cases
and broad, sweeping language of courts that provide little guidance as to scope or limits
of section 5).
260 See supra note 118 (describing Kovacic's belief that courts' lack of deference
stems from agencies' failure to be clear about applicable standards).
261 Cf Einhorn, supra note 224, at 453 ("Many conglomerate cases are not
amenable to an analysis of 'anti-competitive' situations; the most controversial cases
frequently involve companies related only in a very peripheral fashion.").
262 See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text (explaining the shift in merger
enforcement).
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corporations are repeat players and ultimately hope to avoid a
lengthy court proceeding.2 63 Even if the courts had the capacity
and willingness to contain FTC discretion, their means are limited
by the structure of the current merger regime.
Additionally, as this Article argues, both Congressional
history2 " and precedent 265 suggest that FTC's section 5 was
envisioned as and should be used to capture more than the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. As the Court held in Sperry &
Hutchinson, the FTC has license to "proscribe practices as unfair
or deceptive in their effect upon consumers regardless of their
nature or quality as competitive practices or their effect on
competition." 26 6 There is reason, therefore, to think that the courts
should not limit FTC discretion.
Furthermore, although some court guidance is obviously
useful, courts are weary of establishing clear standards and rules.
First, courts are reluctant because of the amorphous nature of
section 5 and the view that it should change with the times.2 67
Second, as Professor Stewart explains, "Even where seemingly
precise standards are provided, the translation of such standards
into operational realities may involve such large measures of
discretion that their practical effect in restraining agency choice
may be extremely limited."2 68 From this view, court guidance
26
See supra notes 55-82 and accompanying text (describing the leverage agencies
have over merging parties).
264 See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (describing
Congressional intent
of section 5 as an expansive provision meant to go beyond confines of section 7); see also
Robert Pitofsky, The PoliticalContent of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 1051, 1054 (1979)
(stating that Congress, in its antitrust enactments, and most clearly when it amended
section 7 of the Clayton Act in 1950, "exhibited a clear concern that an economic order
dominated by a few corporate giants could, during a time of domestic stress or disorder,
facilitate the overthrow of democratic institutions and the installation of a totalitarian
regime. That concern about economic power and the desire that it be dispersed
complements the general American governmental preference for a system of checks and
balances and distribution of authority to prevent abusive actions by the state").
265 See supra notes
147-54 and accompanying text (summarizing early
interpretations of section 5).
266 FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 239 (1972). For a discussion of
some potential areas of expansion, see generally Lande, supra note 200, at 2 (arguing
section 5 expansion should be shaped by consumer choice framework); Salinger, supra
note 200, at 65.
267 See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text (explaining the view of section 5
as a catch all phrase for changing times).
26
Rubenstein, supra note 94, at 2183 (quoting Richard B. Stewart, The
Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667, 1697 n.132
(1975)).
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within the confines of a particular set of facts is difficult and might
not actually provide useful or meaningful limitations on the scope
of section 5. In fact, as this Article argues, despite courts'
adherence to older merger frameworks, the FTC and DOJ are able
to shape merger enforcement through consent decrees and
otherwise, indicating an ultimately limited ability of courts to set
merger rules.2 69
At the same time, we ultimately want court interpretations to
align with the work of the agencies. This will dispel appearances
of discord amongst the courts and agencies and make the merger
process more predictable. The courts' historic use of Merger
Guidelines in its opinions is one example of coordination between
the courts and agencies.2 7 0 However, this coordination is limited to
the few, but still persuasive, section 7 cases on the books that limit
a court's review. When a court, on a rare occasion, hears a merger
case, it can pull from the Merger Guidelines, but is ultimately
In the case of section 7
bound by prior case precedent.
jurisprudence, this means a strong focus on market definition and
market share rather than the emphasis proclaimed by the 2010
Merger Guidelines.2 71 Oracle and Arch Coal exemplify the degree
to which courts are tied to a particular framework of review of
mergers.2 72 Rather than examining new evidence and theories,
courts stick to an analysis which places primary and arguably
dispositive emphasis on market definition. Again in Lundbeck,
where there was a substantial amount of evidence pointing to
anticompetitive effects, the court relied on the Eighth Circuit's
2 7
3 affirming that "[t]he
1995 decision in FTC v. Freeman Hospital,
determination of the relevant market is a 'necessary predicate' to a
finding of a Clayton Act [Section 71 violation."2 74

269 See supra notes 55-82 and accompanying text (providing background on
courts'
limitations resulting from merger enforcement structure).
270 See supra notes 86-94 and accompanying text (outlining ways courts have used
Merger Guidelines as informing merger framework).
271 For a description of 2010 Merger Guidelines and its likely effects on merger
enforcement, see generally Stijepko Tokic, The New Horizontal Merger Guidelines,
22 J. CORP. ACCT. & FIN. 31 (2011).
272 See supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text (describing the courts' approach
in Oracle and Arch Coal).
272 69 F.3d 260, 268 (8th Cir. 1995).
274 F.T.C. v. Lundbeck, Nos. 08-6379 (JNE/JJG), 08-6381 (JNE/JJG), 2010
WL
3810015, at *22 (D. Minn. Aug. 31, 2010) (quoting Freeman Hosp., 69 F.3d at 268), affd,
650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011).
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Section 7 jurisprudence exemplifies the need to create a new
set of FTC Guidelines rather than rely on expanding current
section 7 jurisprudence. Unlike section 7 liability, section 5 claims
may only be brought by the FTC and therefore, courts will be less
worried about private suits. Additionally, unlike section 7 cases,
section 5 does not impose treble damages and so the chilling effect,
which has concerned courts of late,275 will be less prevalent.
Additionally, the courts will have at their disposal a "clean slate"
without the precedential limitations that exist with section 7
cases.
With FTC Guidelines in place, courts would be able to assess
a given merger anew and hopefully, in agreement with the
established FTC practices. Courts will obviously be free to impose
limitations on the Guidelines where they see fit, declaring sections
or parts of them less or more important. But in so doing, courts
will necessarily be sensitive to the importance of flexibility in the
administration of merger regulation and thus sensitive to reading
too narrowly any set of Guidelines that, at the very least, places
parties on notice.276
C. A Plausible Solution?
This Article proposes that the FTC establish its own
Guidelines, which will describe the factors the FTC will consider
in enforcing section 5. In so doing, the FTC Guidelines will
hopefully align current merger enforcement via consent decrees
and elusive ALJ decisions with a public document, giving courts a
framework to better interpret and enforce section 5 and greater
predictability for merging parties. Rather than relying on the

275 See, e.g., Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209,
223 (1993) (unwilling to adopt a lower measure of costs for fear of chilling effect); U.S. v.
AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1115-18 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting theory of capacity
predation and price below marginal cost as appropriate test for fear of chilling effect).
2' Rubenstein, supra note 94, at 2169, 2184-85 (2010) ("These potential virtues in
application often are pitched in relativistic and general terms. Thus conceived, agencies
generally have more expertise with regulatory issues than do Congress, the President, or
the courts. Moreover, agencies generally have better information to draw from in making
policy than do the political or judicial branches. Further, agencies generally can be more
flexible in responding to changing conditions than Congress, which is hampered by the
'finely wrought' bicameralism and presentment requirements, and can be more flexible
than the judiciary, which is constrained by principles of stare decisis.").
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vague language in Sperry & Hutchinson, courts will be able to
proceed with greater faith than in Oracle, Arch Coal, and
Lundbeck, that section 5 enforcement is not "standardless."
That said, this Article does not suggest that the proposal will
not be contentious. First, it gives the FTC jurisdiction over all
industries, which ultimately means more regulation for nearly half
of the industries.2 77 However, it also means that for half of the
industries already subject to FTC review, the process will be more
transparent and more "fair," albeit in a direction that means more
rather than less regulation. Additionally, industry participants
might find expansion via section 5 rather than section 7 more
attractive for the same reasons that the courts might be more
willing to accept section 5 liability: no treble damages and no
private suits. In other words, if section 7 is going to be expanded
in a direction that moves away from market definition as the
Merger Guidelines suggest anyway, industries might prefer that it
come in the form of separate section 5 liability.
The proposal that the FTC guidelines expand to all industries
might also result in growing tensions between the two agencies.
The agencies already enter prolonged merger clearance processes
where a merger involves a "new" market or where the deal is
particularly newsworthy.2 78 At the same time, the agencies do
coordinate with one another in enforcing merger claims-where
criminal charges are brought, the case is given to the DOJ.27
Additionally, the degree to which the FTC Guidelines will step on
the DOJ's toes is hard to predict. It might very well be the case
that, given limited resources, the FTC will divert attention to more
section 5 cases, leaving the brunt of the classic section 7 cases to
the DOJ. While the DOJ might disagree with the provision of
additional enforcement power to the FTC, this expansive power
was envisioned by Congress and might spawn the sort of
competition between agencies originally intended.28 0

For a breakdown of industries across the FTC and the DOJ, see FED. TRADE
COMM'N & U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 14, 3-5,8-11.
277

ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM'N, supra note 24, at 132-37.
FED. TRADE COMM'N, AN FTC GUIDE TO THE ENFORCERS: THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT, STATES, AND PRIVATE PARTIES 1.
278
279

280 See supra notes 142-54 and accompanying text (explaining the congressional
view that section 5 should be more expansive and that the FTC was designed to bring
competition into merger enforcement agencies).
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Although the FTC Guidelines represent a fairly radical
departure from current practice, the FTC may be well positioned
to make such changes in the aftermath of the financial crisis. 28 1
Shortly after the 2008 economic meltdown, many pointed to an
overly liberal merger policy as one potential instigating or
contributory force.282 The critique was that antitrust law had
become too soft, allowing banks and other institutions to get "too
big to fail."283 While the "fix" has come in the form of the Dodd
Frank Act that requires the Federal Reserve to enforce capital and
leverage requirements,2 84 thus making leveraging size less
attractive, the crisis did bring into question current economic
theories upon which antitrust law is based."' Albert Foer,
President of the American Antitrust Institute, recommends
statutory changes to the Clayton Act, thus giving the FTC and

281 See Gotts, supra note 132, at 13 (arguing that certain merger defenses have
been holding less water post financial crisis).
282 See 'Too Big To Fail?': The Role of Antitrust Law in
Government-Funded
Consolidation in the Banking Industry: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts &
Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) (Statement of
Rep. Henry C. "Hank" Johnson, Jr., Chairman, Subcomm, on Courts & Competition
Policy) (stating that if there are banks and financial institutions which are so big that we
cannot allow them to fail, then "should antitrust have prevented them from becoming so
embedded in the economy?"). While many have attributed antitrust law to the financial
crisis, most recognize that banks, unlike other industries, are regulated by multiple
agencies including the Federal Reserve, which was also blamed for allowing banks to get
too big to fail. See Robert P. Zora, Note, Bank Failure Crisis: Challenges in Enforcing
Antitrust Regulation, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1175, 1176 (2009) ("[T]he Federal Reserve and
the Department of Justice began readily approving these 'weekend bank mergers' and
disregarding antitrust regulations. The effect has been a patch-job on an old, leaking
tire.").
282 See Ann Graham, Bringing To Heel the Elephants in the Economy: The Case for
Ending "Too Big To Fail", 8 PIERCE L. REV. 117, 118-29 (2009) (identifying key
regulatory gaps leading to "too big to fail" entities); Zora, supra note 282, at 1188-91
(arguing that the public policy in preventing "too big to fail" trumps antitrust law's sole
concern of anticompetitive effects).
28 See generally S. COMM. ON BANKING, BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE DODD-FRANK
WALL STREET REFORM
AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT,
available at
http://www.banking.senate.gov/public/_files/070110_Dodd FrankWallStreet Reform
comprehensive summaryFinal.pdf (last visited Mar. 12, 2014).
285 See Alan Devlin, Antitrust in an Era of Market Failure, 33 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 557, 581-85 (2010) (discussing the degree to which the financial crisis challenged
current antitrust economic theories); J. Thomas Rosch, Comm'r, Fed. Trade Comm'n,
Remarks to the New York Bar Association Annual Dinner: Implications of the Financial
Meltdown for the FTC 2 (Jan. 29, 2009), available at www.ftc.gov/speechestrosch/
090129financialcrisisnybarspeech.pdf ("One thing is clear to me: the orthodox and
unvarnished Chicago School of economic theory is on life support, if it is not dead.").
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other regulators greater power to oversee bank mergers. 286
Alternatively, current antitrust law could be interpreted more
broadly, giving the antitrust agencies greater flexibility in
addressing various mergers and their effects on the economy.2 87
From this view, the economic crisis has provided the FTC with an
opportunity to justify an expansion of section 5 in light of the
dissatisfactory outcomes in which the narrow reading of the
Clayton Act resulted.28 8
One way to fill this perceived gap in antitrust enforcement is
through the creation of FTC Guidelines. The economic crisis has
provided circumstances where courts and legislators may be
receptive to an expansion of antitrust liability under transparent
standards. FTC Guidelines, properly drafted, could achieve this
objective, and expansion through section 5 seems appropriate
because it has no historical baggage tying it down to a particular
understanding of economic modeling or view of merger
enforcement.2 89
Finally, the FTC would be smart to develop such section 5
Guidelines in light of the more recent defeats before the courts.
Although the FTC does benefit from the current system in that it
does have significant ability to shift doctrine in particular cases, it
is still constrained by the courts. As the FTC tries to push
286 Albert A. Foer, Preserving Competition After the Banking Meltdown,
GCP: THE
ONLINE MAG. FOR GLOBAL COMPETITION POL'Y, Dec. 2008, at 3, 12,
http/A/www.antitrustinstitute.org/files/bank%20meltdown%20article%2012-16-08_1215

20082145.pdf ("Congress could modify the Clayton Act in such a way that the antitrust
agencies .. .could participate when a potential merger is characterized as involving a
keystone firm."); see also Kanwit, supra note 111 (noting that the FTC has lobbied for
expanded section 5 and amended section 7).
287 Foer, supra note 286, at 12 (noting that allowing agencies to consider whether
merger will weaken a company financially might be one positive step but that "[t]his is
not the current interpretation of the law").
288 See Thomas B. Leary, A Suggestion for the Revival of Section 5, THE ANTITRUST
SOURCE, at 4-5 (Feb. 2009), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalpublishing/
antitrust source/Feb09_Leary2_26f.authcheckdam.pdf ("Recent events in the financial
sector suggest another possible use of Section 5," and that it might consider incorporating
whether "an over-leveraged buyout could impair the competitive potency of an aggressive
company in the same way that acquisition by a more staid rival could" into its analysis);
supra notes 184-200 and accompanying text (discussing the current interpretation of the
Clayton Act).
28. See Maurice E. Stucke, Lessons from the Financial Crisis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J.
313, 341 (2010) ("The regulatory, intellectual, and moral failures of the past decade
have already prompted competition lawyers and economists in the United
States ... to reconsider the assumptions underlying current competition policies and
whether such policies are indeed achieving their desired goals.").
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doctrine further and if it continues to face defeats in the
courtroom, parties may be less willing to settle and more willing to
establish binding precedent through the court system. Although
the courts have yet to speak on the specific scope of section 5, the
FTC would be wise to at least establish its interpretation and
understanding of the scope of section 5 enforcement power which
may influence a subsequent court interpretation rather than have
a court establish section 5 precedent without FTC input.
Additionally, it gives the FTC an opportunity to further
distinguish itself from the DOJ as an independent enforcement
agency that has particular hold over a certain type of merger
which serves the FTC well in its ongoing turf wars with the DOJ.
CONCLUSION

Merger enforcement is constantly changing at the behest of
the FTC and the DOJ. The approaches have not likely changed
drastically over the course of the past twenty years, although,
recent amendments to the Merger Guidelines suggest that there
might be greater divergence between the agencies and courts than
previously known. The FTC is particularly well-positioned to
expand merger enforcement through the use of administrative
proceedings and the added charge of section 5. To address the
growing gap between courts and agencies and to make the merger
process more transparent, the FTC should develop FTC Guidelines
targeting mergers of particular interest under section 5 as
separate from section 7 in a fashion not too dissimilar from the
development of the agencies' Merger Guidelines in the 1980s.
As this Article argues, one potential area of expansion is in
modem day conglomerates such as Amazon. FTC Guidelines are
preferable to a narrow court interpretation because of the
structural limitations imposed on courts and are preferable to an
expanded section 7 scope because they do not carry the risk of
treble damages and private suits. Additionally, FTC Guidelines
would give courts, in the same way they would give ALJs, some
leeway in the interpretation of antitrust law. The courts have
been reluctant to give substance to section 5, but by producing
FTC Guidelines, the FTC will be able to give the courts some
substance with which to work, thus invigorating enforcement of
section 5 to the level previously envisioned by its drafters.
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